CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-FIRST AMENDMENT-FEDERAL REGULATION PROHIBITING DISCLOSURE OF A BEER'S ALCOHOL CONTENT
ON ITS LABEL VIOLATES THE COMMERCIAL SPEECH DOCTmINE-

Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co., 115 S.Ct. 1585 (1995).

"It is precisely this kind of choice, between the dangers of suppressing information, and the dangers of its misuse if it is freely
available, that the First Amendment makes for us. " '
The First Amendment provides that "Congress shall make no

law... abridging the freedom of speech."2 Although the Founding Fathers never specifically defined the parameters of the freedom of speech, the evolution of First Amendment jurisprudence
has segregated speech into certain categories that are entitled to

protection and others that are not.3 Commercial speech, defined
1 Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425
U.S. 748, 770 (1976); see infra notes 57-66 and accompanying text (discussing Virginia
State Board of Pharmacy's place in the evolution of the commercial speech doctrine).
2 U.S. CONST. amend. I. The First Amendment provides in full: "Congress shall
make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise
thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances." Id. The Supreme Court has explained that the First Amendment "was
fashioned to assure unfettered interchange of ideas for the bringing about of political
and social changes desired by the people." New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S.
254, 269 (1964) (quoting Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484 (1957)).
3 See LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTUTIONAL LAw §§ 12-1 to -2, at 785-94
(2d ed. 1988). The First Amendment sets forth protection of press, assembly, speech,
petition, and association. See id. § 12-1, at 785. Commonly referred to as the freedom
of expression, this method of sending a message conveys both ideas and inarticulable
emotions as well. See id. at 787 (quoting Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 26 (1971)).
In Cohen v. California,the Supreme Court reversed a municipal conviction based upon
a draft opponent's display of an expletive on his jacket in a Los Angeles courthouse.
See Cohen, 403 U.S. at 15-28.
Over the course of recognizing this freedom, the Court has reviewed a variety of
means whereby the government may regulate speech. See TRIBE, supra, § 12-2, at 789.
Additionally, the Court has classified types of speech entitled to protection under the
First Amendment. See id. at 789. The government may attempt to restrict the ideas or
information conveyed by speech, known as "content-based" restrictions. See id. Alternatively, governments may regulate speech "content-neutrally," furthering goals unrelated to the speech at issue. See id. at 789-90. In order for the government to lawfully
restrict the communicative impact of speech, via a content-based restriction, the
speech must fall into a category determined by the Supreme Court to be unprotected
by the First Amendment. See id. at 791-92. Exclusion of a category of expression from
constitutional protections "represents an implicit conclusion that the governmental
interests ... are such as to justify whatever limitation is thereby placed on the free
expression of ideas." Id. at 792.
When the government's aim is the noncommunicative impact of a given type of
speech, the competing interests must be balanced to determine the constitutionality
of the regulation. See id. at 791 (citing Konigsberg v. State Bar, 366 U.S. 36, 50-51
(1961)). Provided that the regulation does not "unduly constrict the flow of informa-
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as speech that advertises a service or product for a business purtion and ideas," it will be upheld as consistent with the First Amendment. See id. at
792.
Case analysis by the Supreme Court has identified several categories of speech
not entitled to First Amendment protection. See, e.g., New York Times Co., 376 U.S. at
264-305 (announcing that defamation of private individuals is not entitled to protection, although different rules apply for public officials acting in their official capacity); Roth, 354 U.S. at 476, 489 (explaining that obscenity, determined by "whether to
the average person, applying contemporary community standards, the dominant
theme of the material taken as a whole appeals to prurient interest," is not entitled to
protection) (footnote omitted); Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572
(1942) (stating that words "which by their very utterance inflict injury or tend to incite an immediate breach of the peace" are fighting words and as such are not entitled to protection); Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919) (maintaining
that words of such a nature and used in such circumstances as "to create a clear and
present danger that they will bring about the substantive evils that Congress has a
right to prevent" are unprotectable). Over the course of time, the Supreme Court has
recognized that an advertiser's communication in pursuit of profit cannot be deprived of First Amendment protection. SeeTIUBE, supra, § 12-15, at 891. In formulating the commercial speech doctrine, the Court has relied heavily on "the 'commonsense' distinction between speech proposing a commercial transaction... and other
varieties of speech." Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626, 637
(1985) (quoting Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447, 455-56 (1978)). Early
cases in the evolution of commercial speech indicated the Court's belief that consumers can only determine their best interests when they have adequate information to
do so. See TRIBE, supra, § 12-15, at 893. The Court advised that the best method for
allowing this self-determination is to permit open avenues of communication. See id.
In the context of consumer pharmaceuticals, the Court recounted:
As to the particular consumer's interest in the free flow of commercial
information, that interest may be as keen, if not keener by far, than his
interest in the day's most urgent political debate ....

Those whom the

suppression of prescription drug price information hits the hardest are
the poor, the sick, and particularly the aged. A disproportionate
amount of their income tends to be spent on prescription drugs; yet
they are the least able to learn, by shopping from pharmacist to pharmacist, where their scarce dollars are best spent. When drug prices vary
as strikingly as they do, information as to who is charging what becomes
more than a convenience. It could mean the alleviation of physical pain
or the enjoyment of basic necessities.
Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 763-64 (footnote omitted); see also City of
Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc., 507 U.S. 410, 432 (1993) (Blackmun,J., concurring) (espousing that "'the free flow of commercial information is indispensable .. .to the proper allocation of resources in a free enterprise system ...

[and] to

the formation of intelligent opinions as to how that system ought to be regulated or
altered"') (quoting Virginia State Board of Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 765)). Other federal
court cases have stressed the importance of the free flow of commercial speech. See
Alex Kozinski & Stuart Banner, The Anti-History and Pre-Histomy of Commercial Speech, 71
TEX. L. REv. 747, 751-52 (1993) (noting the peculiarity of the argument that commercial speech is of lesser value to society and should therefore not receive constitutional
protection, when the purpose of the First Amendment is to protect speech from prohibition by a disapproving majority). See generally Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809
(1975); Chicago Joint Bd. v. Chicago Tribune Co., 435 F.2d 470 (7th Cir. 1970); Fur
Info. & Fashion Council, Inc. v. E. F. Timme & Son, Inc., 364 F. Supp. 16 (S.D.N.Y.
1973).
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pose or for profit,4 falls somewhere between the two extremes of
absolute protection and no protection.5
The United States Supreme Court, when first presented with
the issue of commercial speech, viewed it as a classification totally
unworthy of First Amendment protection.6 Over the next three
decades, however, that view began to shift until the Court announced that speech of a commercial nature was entitled
to the
7
same freedoms as other categories of protected speech.
The Court, recognizing that commercial speech deserved protection, developed a step-by-step analysis for determining whether
4 See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 185 (6th ed. 1991). BLACK'S defines commercial
speech as "speech that advertised a product or service for profit or for business purpose." Id. BLACK'S states that "speech... 'commercial' in nature ... was formerly not
afforded First Amendment freedom of speech protection, and as such could be freely
regulated by statutes and ordinances." Id. This doctrine, however, has been essentially abrogated. See id.
The Supreme Court has also set forth a definition of commercial speech, providing that such speech is "expression related solely to the economic interests of the
speaker and its audience." Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv.
Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 561 (1980). The Court more recently recognized advertising
as commercial speech. See Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 637.
5 See Bruce P. Keller, Recent Developments in the Law of Advertising and Commercial
Speech, A.L.I.-A.BA. COURSE OF STUDY MATERIALS: TRADEMARKS, UNFAIR COMPETITION,
AND COPYRIGHTS: RECENT DEVELOPMENTS AND OTHER IMPORTANT ISSUES, 47, 52 (Nov.
20-21, 1992). Prior to the Court's decision in Valentine v.Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52
(1942), there had been no indication that commercial speech was included in the
category of speech subject to restrictions. See id. at 52; see also infra note 6 (discussing
the Court's introduction to free speech jurisprudence in Valentine). Some authors
assert the view that Central Hudson restricts certain categories of speech that would
otherwise be afforded protection if not in the commercial speech context. See Keller,
supra, at 55. Critics note that courts may vary the amount of scrutiny applied to the
factors of the Central Hudson test. See id. Furthermore, the Supreme Court has set
forth the view that commercial speech is entitled to a "different degree of protection."
See Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 771-72 n.24. Justice Blackmun, writing for
the majority in Virginia State Board of Pharmacy, explained that this difference is, in
part, due to the fact that commercial speech is often "more durable" than other types
of speech and consists of "objective" information. See id.
6 See Valentine, 316 U.S. at 54. The Court in Valentine explained that the First
Amendment allows for the dissemination of information and opinions on streets and
public thoroughfares and that the states and local governmental bodies could regulate such communications so long as the methods utilized did not unduly burden or
proscribe free speech. See id. The Court continued by expressly holding that the
Constitution did not afford "purely commercial advertising" this same level of deference. See id. The Court thus granted permission for states and municipalities to regulate commercial speech in whatever way they deemed necessary. See id; see also infra
notes 52-56 and accompanying text (discussing the Court's decision in Valentine).
7 See Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 770. Although the Virginia State
Board of Pharmacy Court held that commercial speech is entitled to First Amendment
protection, it emphasized that such protection is not absolute. See id. at 770-71; see also
infra notes 57-66 and accompanying text (describing Virginia State Board of Pharmacy's
pivotal role in the development of the commercial speech doctrine).
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a particular regulation unconstitutionally infringed upon a
speaker's First Amendment right to free speech in CentralHudson
Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Service Commission.8 First, a court exam-

ines whether the speech at issue falls into a category of speech historically afforded constitutional protection.9 Upon a finding that
such speech is protected by the First Amendment, a court then
analyzes whether the interest set forth by the government is substantial and whether the regulation at issue directly advances that
interest without being more intrusive than necessary to achieve the
government's goal. 10
In the fifteen years since Central Hudson, the Supreme Court
has applied the Central Hudson test to a wide variety of subject matter including the use of newsracks," in-person solicitation by attor8 447 U.S. 557, 566 (1980).
9 See id.; see also supranote 3 (detailing the categories of speech that the Supreme
Court deems entitled to First Amendment protection and those the Court considers
outside its parameters).
10 See Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 566. Specifically, the Court announced:
In commercial speech cases, then, a four-part analysis has developed.
At the outset, we must determine whether the expression is protected by
the First Amendment. For commercial speech to come within that provision, it at least must concern lawful activity and not be misleading.
Next, we ask whether the asserted governmental interest is substantial.
If both inquiries yield positive answers, we must determine whether the
regulation directly advances the governmental interest asserted, and
whether it is not more extensive than is necessary to serve that interest.
Id.
11 See City of Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc., 507 U.S. 410 (1993). In City of
Cincinnati, Discovery Network, Inc., a company in the business of offering recreational, social, and educational activities for adults in Cincinnati and the surrounding
locales, published free magazines nine times each year advertising these services. See
id. at 412. In addition to containing information pertaining to these programs, Discovery Network's magazines also related the details of local events of possible interest.
See id. In 1989, the City of Cincinnati granted permission to Discovery Network to
install 38 newsracks on public property, through which Discovery Network distributed
approximately one-third of its total free circulation. See id. Harmon Publishing Company also published a free magazine, describing real estate for sale as well as financial
information relating to the real estate market, and distributed this publication in the
same manner utilized by Discovery Network. See id. at 412-13. In March 1990, Cincinnati's Director of Public Works advised both companies that their permits authorizing
the use of dispensing devices on public property had been revoked and directed that,
in compliance with the municipal code, the newsracks be taken down within 30 days.
See id. at 413. The applicable code section prohibited the distribution of commercial
handbills, in any public place. See id.
After conducting an evidentiary hearing, the district court determined that Cincinnati's regulations violated the First Amendment. See id. at 414. The court found
that both publications qualified as commercial speech. See id. Although acknowledging that the City possessed the authority to regulate newsracks to advance safety and
aesthetics, the court held that the Cincinnati regulation did not reasonably fit its articulated objectives, as required by the decision in Board of Trustees v. Fox. See id. (cit-
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neys' 2 and accountants,1 3 gambling,14 lotteries,1 5 and in-room
ing Board of Trustees v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 480 (1989)). The court's
unreasonableness determination focused on the "minimal" effect the newsracks had
on public safety, compared with the approximately 1500 devices untouched by the
ordinance. See id. The court emphasized that other cities successfully protected safety
and aesthetics by regulations that did not completely eliminate channels of distribution. See id. The Court ofAppeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed, noting that the
furtherance of safety and beauty, observed in the totality of this case's circumstances,
did not justify the burden placed on the right to free speech. See id. at 415.
The United States Supreme Court, Justice Stevens writing for the majority, upheld the decisions of the lower courts. See id. at 412. The Court acknowledged that
the speech at issue constituted commercial speech and that the state interest was substantial. See id. at 416-17. The Court then engaged in a "reasonable fit" analysis. See
id. Justice Stevens noted that the City originally enacted the contested prohibition to
combat littering, without any consideration as to newsracks. See id. at 418-19. The
Justice stated that Cincinnati's justification for revoking the permits proved inadequate because of the small number of newsracks dedicated to Discovery Network's
and Harmon's magazines in relation to the overall number of newsracks in the city.
See id. at 418. Justice Stevens further stated that the devices at issue presented no
greater harm to the public than those allowed to remain. See id. at 419-20. The majority discussed the distinction between commercial and noncommercial speech set
forth by Cincinnati as a justification for its actions and concluded that this distinction
failed to provide any relation to the interests set forth by the City. See id. at 424. The
Court specifically stated that "in this case, the distinction bears no relationship whatsoever to the particular interests that the city has asserted." Id.
Addressing the government's asserted goal of aesthetics, Justice Stevens noted
that the newsracks used by Discovery Network and Harmon had the same appearance
as those the City allowed to remain. See id. at 425. The Justice elaborated that the
newspaper dispensing devices, by virtue of their greater number, would contribute
more to the perception that city newsracks constituted an eyesore and caused increased amounts of litter. See id. The Court, however, cautioned that this holding
applied to the specific facts of the instant case; given different facts and circumstances, a city may be able to impose dissimilar regulations on commercial and noncommercial speech without violating the First Amendment. See id. at 428.
Turning to the City's contention that the regulation constituted a reasonable
restriction on time, place, or manner of speech, the majority quickly dispensed with
this argument. See id. at 428-29. The Court pointed out that this argument applied
only to content-neutral restrictions and that the regulation at issue was clearly content-based, as it focused on differences in textual material. See id. at 429-30. Thus, the
Court held the ordinance to be content-based and in violation of the First Amendment. See id. at 430-31.
In summary, the majority reiterated that Cincinnati's ordinance failed to meet
both the "reasonable fit" requirement for commercial speech matters and the necessary guidelines for content-neutral restrictions on speech. See id. at 430. The Court
therefore affirmed the lower courts' decisions, holding that Cincinnati's ordinance
was unconstitutional. See id. at 431.
12 See Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447 (1978). Ohralik, decided prior
to the Court's establishment of the four-part test for commercial speech in Central
Hudson, dealt with in-person client solicitation efforts by attorneys. See id. at 448-49.
Ohralik, an attorney, learned of a recent automobile accident while collecting his
mail at the local post office. See id. at 449. Ohralik visited the parents of one of the
victims at their home and suggested that they retain a lawyer. See id. Upon their
refusal, Ohralik went to the hospital to speak with the victim, Carol McClintock, and
found her lying in traction. See id. at 450. A discussion ensued, during which Ohralik
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offered her legal services. See id. Through her parents, Carol later accepted Ohralik's
offer. See id. Two days following her acceptance, Ohralik once again visited Carol's
hospital room to have her sign a fee agreement providing him with a one-third share
of whatever recovery she might receive. See id.
During this period, Ohralik deceptively procured the other victim's name,
Wanda Lou Holbert, from the McClintocks and made an uninvited visit to her home.
See id. at 451. Concealing a tape recorder, Ohralik recorded most of his conversation
with Wanda, including both his offer to represent her for a one-third contingent fee,
as well as her acceptance of his offer. See id. The following day, Wanda's mother tried
to negate any contract that may have been formed between Ohralik and Wanda, but
Ohralik refused to acknowledge such repudiation. See id. at 451-52. Despite Wanda's
reinforcement of her renunciation soon thereafter in writing, Ohralik continued to
hold himself out as her counsel. See id. at 452. Additionally, when Carol released
Ohralik as her attorney, he filed suit against her for breach of contract. See id.
Both victims filed complaints against Ohralik with the county bar association's
grievance committee, which referred the matter to the Ohio State Bar Association.
See id. The state bar association filed a formal complaint against Ohralik with the
appropriate subdivision of the Supreme Court of Ohio. See id. at 452-53. Following a
hearing, the commission determined that Ohralik, through his actions, violated two
distinct disciplinary rules of the Ohio Code of Professional Responsibility that regulated lawyers' methods of obtaining employment. See id. at 453. The Supreme Court
of Ohio embraced the commission's findings and emphasized that Ohralik's conduct
was not a form of expression entitled to constitutional protection. See id.
The United States Supreme Court, Justice Powell writing for the majority, held
that in-person solicitation of employment by an attorney failed even to rise to the level
of honest advertising about standard legal services. See id. at 455. The Justice noted
that the goal of the disciplinary rules was to prevent injurious conduct before it actually occurred. See id. at 464. The majority further acknowledged Ohio's interest in
maintaining professionalism among licensed occupations, including attorneys. See id.
at 460-61. The Court continued by observing that in-person solicitation often fails to
provide consumers with a chance to compare or contemplate the information
presented to them. See id. at 457. Justice Powell elaborated by recognizing the pressure and immediacy inherent in in-person solicitation situations. See id. Additionally,
the majority noted the heightened "potential for overreaching" when solicitors possess a high level of training in the most effective methods of persuasion and the subject of their efforts is hurt or unaware of their need for the solicitors' services. See id.
at 464-65; see also infra note 103 (declining to extend the deference given to prophylactic rules in the attorney context to regulations regarding accountants).
The majority determined that Ohio articulated a compelling interest in curbing
the evils accompanying in-person solicitation. See Ohralik, 436 U.S. at 459, 462. As a
result, the Court concluded that the state has the power to regulate both the economics of employment and professionalism. See id. at 460-62. The Court thus upheld the
constitutionality of the disciplinary rules at issue as applied to Ohralik. See id. at 468.
Other Supreme Court cases have focused on the issue of attorney solicitation in
the free speech context. See generally Florida Bar v. Went For It, Inc., 115 S. Ct. 2371
(1995) (examining a state-imposed waiting period between an accident and an attorney's solicitation of victims or their relatives as clients); Shapero v. Kentucky Bar
Ass'n, 486 U.S. 466 (1988) (reviewing attorney solicitation through advertisements
mailed to a specific group of individuals following and related to a specific occurrence); Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626 (1985) (addressing a
state rule requiring disclosure of contingent fee rates in attorney advertisements);
Bates v. State Bar, 433 U.S. 350 (1977) (examining a ban on all forms of attorney
advertising). See also Jorge L. Carro & Lisa A. Martinez, Ohio's Ethical Prohibition
Against the Use of Dual Degrees in Letterheads: A Time for Change?, 18 U. DAYTON L. REv.

1996]

NOTE

325

63, 75-76 (1992) (explaining that although attorney advertising falls within the realm
of commercial speech, the Supreme Court determined that a prophylactic ban on inperson solicitation was proper); Marc D. Lawlor, Note, Ivory Tower Paternalism and
Lawyer Advertising: The Case ofFlorida Bar v. Went For It, Inc., 40 ST. Louis U. LJ.895,
918-27 (1996) (analyzing the effect the F/orida Bar decision will have on the legal
profession's use of various methods of commercial speech).
13 See Edenfield v. Fane, 507 U.S. 761 (1993)., In Edenfield, the Court invalidated a
state rule forbidding in-person solicitation by accountants. See id. at 777. The Court
held that the state's interest in protecting client privacy and maintaining accountant
independence was not sufficiently narrow to withstand commercial speech scrutiny.
See id. at 776-77; see also infra notes 96-103 and accompanying text (discussing Edenfield
in greater detail).
14 See Posadas de Puerto Rico Assocs. v. Tourism Co., 478 U.S. 328, 348 (1986)
(sustaining a state ban on casino advertising to island citizens on the grounds that the
government's interest in protecting citizenry health and welfare withstood scrutiny
because the ban still afforded the citizens other legal forms of gambling); see also infra
notes 77-89 and accompanying text (discussing Posadas).
15 See United States v. Edge Broadcasting Co., 509 U.S. 418 (1993). In Edge Broadcasting Co., the federal government had, shortly after the birth of broadcast media,
enacted statutes prohibiting broadcasts of information regarding lotteries or similar
endeavors and advertisements of these events. See id. at 422. Subsequent amendments to these statutes provided that a broadcaster may advertise a state-sponsored
lottery so long as the broadcast station running the advertisements was licensed to a
state that conducted a lottery under its own auspices. See id. With these amendments,
Congress intended to meet the needs of states sponsoring official lotteries while continuing to respect the policies of those states choosing to prohibit government-run
lotteries. See id. at 422-23.
Power 94, a radio station licensed in North Carolina, operated under the ownership of Edge Broadcasting Company. See id. at 423. Broadcasting from a city located
three miles from the North Carolina-Virginia border, Virginians comprised the majority (92.2%) of the station's listening audience. See id. at 423-24. North Carolina does
not conduct a state-run lottery and has enacted statutes criminalizing participation in
or advertisement of non-exempt lotteries. See id. at 423. Virginia authorizes and conducts lotteries under its power to do so. See id. The federal regulations barred Power
94 from broadcasting Virginia lottery advertisements, thus causing the station a substantial loss in revenue. See id. at 423-24. Edge Broadcasting Company filed a motion
in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, requesting a
declaratory judgment declaring, inter alia, the relevant federal regulations, as applied, constitutionally void under the First Amendment. See id. at 424.
The district court found that the speech qualified as commercial speech; the
asserted governmental interests were substantial; and a "reasonable fit" existed between the interests and the regulations. See id. at 424-25. The Court held, however,
that the regulations as applied to Edge did not "directly advance" the government's
goal, thus failing to satisfy the third requirement of the CentralHudson test. See id. As
such, the Court ruled that the application of the federal rules to Edge was unconstitutional. See id. The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed the decision of
the district court in an unreported per curiam opinion. See id. at 425.
The United States Supreme Court, in an opinion authored by Justice White, reversed the decisions of the lower courts and held that the statutes under review regulated commercial speech in a fashion consistent with the First Amendment. See id. at
436. Justice White, adopting the findings of the lower courts, declared that the
speech constituted commercial speech and that the interest in respecting the policies
of the individual states as to state-sponsored lotteries was substantial, thereby satisfying
the first two requirements of the Central Hudson test. See id. at 426. The Court, mov-
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demonstrations in a dormitory.1 6 The four-part CentralHudson test
has been streamlined-the modern focus being that regulations
"directly advance" 17 and are reasonably tailored to the goal sought
to be achieved. 8 Even though protection of commercial speech is
a relatively well-settled body of law, the Court has routinely reviewed and modified prior interpretations of the doctrine. 9
ing to step three under the CentralHudson test, found that the statutes "directly advanced" the government's interest in respecting the decisions of the individual states.
See id. at 427-28. Discussing the statutes both generally and as applied to Edge,Justice
White determined that by supporting those states that choose not to conduct lotteries, while not impeding the efforts of the states sponsoring lotteries, the government
had developed a method that satisfied the "direct advancement" requirement. See id.
428-29. The Justice then turned to the final step of the Central Hudson test and announced that, both in general and as applied to Edge, the statutes at issue provided a
"reasonable fit" with the government's asserted interests. See id. at 429-35. The Court
also examined the numerical data relating to the broadcast audiences in North Carolina and Virginia and determined that the lower courts had incorrectly evaluated the
impact of these statistics. See id. at 431-35. Following this review, the majority reversed
the decisions of the lower courts and upheld the federal regulations as constitutional
under the Central Hudson test. See id. at 436.
Commentators have observed that Edge Broadcastingappears to be a retreat from
the deference afforded commercial speech in recent decisions. See Laura J. Schiller,
Note, The Lottery in United States v. Edge Broadcasting Co.: Vice or Victim of the Commercial Speech Doctrine, 2 VILL. SPORTS & ENr. L.F. 127, 145-52, 158 (1995) (noting that
the Court displayed a strong protection for commercial speech when it invalidated
restrictions on commercial speech in City of Cinncinati and Edenfield but retreated
from that position that same term with the Edge Broadcastingdecision). One author
has articulated the view that the holding in Edge Broadcastingcan be reconciled with
modern commercial speech review. See Erica Swecker, Note, Joe Camel: Will "OldJoe"
Survive?, 36 WM. & MARY L. REv. 1519, 1544 (1995) (articulating that in light of the
Court's view of gambling as a vice that could be subject to regulation, the holding in
Edge Broadcastingcan be reconciled with modern commercial speech review).
16 See Board of Trustees v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 480-81 (1989) (holding that a university regulation banning in-room demonstrations to protect the safety and welfare of
students need only have a "reasonable fit" to the governmental interest); see also infra
notes 90-95 and accompanying text (discussing Fox's relevance in the development of
commercial speech jurisprudence).
17 See Edenfield, 507 U.S. at 767. For example, the focus of Edenfield dealt with the
"direct and material" advancement requirement, the third prong of the commercial
speech test introduced in CentralHudson. See id. The Court, quickly dispensing with
the substantiality analysis, spent the majority of the opinion discussing this third step
of the test. See id. at 768-77; see also infra notes 96-103 and accompanying text (discussing Edenfield).
18 See Fox, 492 U.S. at 471. Justice Scalia, in the opening paragraph of his opinion
in Fox, stated that the issue before the Court involved a determination of "whether
governmental restrictions upon commercial speech are invalid if they go beyond the
least restrictive means to achieve the desired end." Id. The Court immediately disposed of the first three steps of the CentralHudson analysis and spent the remainder of
the opinion determining the appropriate standard for the fourth step of the analysis.
See id. at 473-76.
19 See 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 116 S. Ct. 1495, 1515 (1996) (invalidating Rhode Island's ban on honest, nondeceptive price advertising of alcoholic bever-
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In Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co., 2° one of the most recent chapters
in the history of commercial speech cases, the United States
Supreme Court examined a beer manufacturer's claim that the
federal regulation prohibiting disclosure of beer alcohol content
on its product's label violated its First Amendment right to free
speech. 2 ' The Court held that although the government's interest
22
in preventing competition based on beer potency among brewers
was substantial, the government's means for furthering that interest did not accomplish that end in a "direct and material fashion,"and was not the least intrusive method for achieving the
government's goal. 23 The Court, in declaring the federal labeling
restriction to be an unconstitutional infringement on commercial
speech, affirmed the holdings of both the district court and the
court of appeals.2 4
ages as unconstitutional under the commercial speech doctrine); Rubin v. Coors
Brewing Co., 115 S. Ct. 1585, 1594 (1995) (holding that a ban on disclosing beer
alcohol content on the product's label failed to satisfy the Central Hudson test and was
therefore unconstitutional under the First Amendment's right to freedom of speech);
Edge Broadcasting Co., 509 U.S. at 436 (determining that regardless of the state in
which the primary audience resides, federal regulations allowing the transmission of
lottery advertisements by broadcasters only if the broadcaster is licensed to a state
offering a lottery are constitutional under the commercial speech doctrine); City of
Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc., 507 U.S. 410, 430-31 (1993) (announcing that a
city's refusal to allow continued distribution of commercial publications via newsracks
placed throughout the city, while not terminating the similar distribution of newspapers, unconstitutionally infringed upon the freedoms afforded commercial speech by
the First Amendment).
20 115 S. Ct. 1585 (1995) [hereinafter Coors].
21 See id. at 1590-94. In analyzing the speech at issue, the Court utilized the fourstep test set forth in Central Hudson. See id. at 1589-94; see also supra notes 9-10 and
accompanying text (detailing the commercial speech test promulgated by the
Supreme Court).
22 This competition is commonly referred to as strength wars. See Coors, 115 S. Ct.
at 1588.
23 See id. at 1594.
24 See id. at 1588, 1594. The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit,
after its first review, remanded the case to the United States District Court for the
District of Colorado to determine the constitutionality of 27 U.S.C §§ 205(e) (2) and
205(f) (2). See id. Upon remand, the district court determined that the labeling ban
imposed by § 205(e) (2) unconstitutionally infringed on Coors's First Amendment
rights. See id. The court also held, however, that the advertising ban promulgated by
§ 205(0(2) was constitutional. See id. The court of appeals affirmed this judgment.
See id. On appeal to the Supreme Court, Coors did not challenge the determination
regarding the advertising ban. See id. Thus, the only issue for the Court's review
involved the government's challenge of the labeling ban. See id.
Similarly, in Hornell Brewing Co. v. Brady, the United States District Court for the
Eastern District of New York held that a governmental ban on the use of the name
"Crazy Horse" on alcoholic beverage labels constituted a violation of the brewing
company's First Amendment right to free speech. 819 F. Supp. 1227, 1246 (E.D.N.Y.
1993). The Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms (BATF) denied Hornell Brew-
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In 1987, Coors Brewing Company (Coors), a Colorado-based
beer manufacturer, requested permission from the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms (BATF) to begin using modified prod-

uct labels and advertisements clearly stating the alcohol content of
its beers.2 5 The BATF denied the application, asserting that
§§ 205(e) (2) and 205(f) (2) of the Federal Alcohol Administration
Act of 1935 (the Act) prohibited disclosure of a beer's alcohol content both on product labels and in advertisements.2 6

ing Company permission to use "Crazy Horse" on any future product labels and revoked a previously issued certificate of approval allowing use of that name on labels.
See id. at 1231. The district court applied the CentralHudson test on the basis that malt
liquor labels were "indisputably" commercial speech. See id. at 1233. The court noted
that alcoholic beverages bearing the name of an Indian hero would have an increased
appeal to the Native American population. See id. at 1235-36. Finding that the government possessed a substantial interest in protecting the health, safety, and welfare
of the Native American population, the court concluded that the regulation satisfied
the second step of the Central Hudson test. See id. at 1236.
The court then found that the BATF ban did not "directly advance" the governmental interest, in that it affected every consumer possessing a desire to drink the
Crazy Horse product, not merely the segment of the population the state sought to
protect. See id. at 1238. Consequently, the court found that the third step of the
Central Hudson test was not satisfied. See id. Concluding its Central Hudson analysis,
the Court determined that the ban was more pervasive than necessary to achieve the
government's goal, thereby failing the fourth step of the test. See id. at 1239.
25 See Adolph Coors Co. v. Brady, 944 F.2d 1543, 1545 (10th Cir. 1991) [hereinafter Coors 1]. Coors sought approval of labels and advertisements for both Coors and
Coors Light beer. See id. The government asserted that Coors's motive for challenging the labeling ban was the desire to dispel the misperception among consumers that
Coors products contained less alcohol and were therefore weaker than competing
products. Petitioner's Brief, Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co., No. 93-1631, 1994 WL
412675, at * 36 (U.S. 1994); see also Petitioner's Reply Brief, Rubin v. Coors Brewing
Co., No. 93-1631, 1994 WL 570303, at *5 (U.S. 1994). The government supported
this contention in its brief to the Supreme Court by emphasizing that at oral argument before the Tenth Circuit, Coors admitted "'that it desires to publish the alcohol
content of its products to dispel Coors' [s] image of being a 'weak' beer.'" Petitioner's
Brief at *36. The government pointed to the distribution by Coors of wallet cards
containing information disclosing the alcohol content of a number of competing
beer products as evidence of Coors's true intentions. Petitioner's Reply Brief at *5.
By giving consumers this information, the government claimed, Coors was attempting
to make them aware of the levels of alcohol in Coors's and competitors' beers. See id.
Coors countered this assertion by arguing that the overall result of allowing alcohol content information to be printed on beer labels would be to decrease the average amount of alcohol consumed by beer drinkers. Respondent's Brief, Rubin v.
Coors Brewing Co., No. 93-1631, 1994 WL 509885, at *19 n.19 (U.S. 1994). This
projected result, Coors argued, directly contradicted the government's claimed interest in preventing strength wars by not allowing the dissemination of alcohol content
information on product labels. See id.
26 See Coors I, 944 F.2d at 1545. The BATF asserted that unless state law required
disclosure of alcohol content information, §§ 205(e) (2) and (f)(2) prohibited such
dissemination on alcohol product labels. See id. The statutory provisions at issue in
Coors I provide the following:
§ 205. Unfair competition and unlawful practices
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It shall be unlawful for any person engaged in business as a distiller,
brewer, rectifier, blender, or other producer, or as an importer or
wholesaler, of distilled spirits, wine, or malt beverages, or as a bottler, or
warehouseman and bottler, of distilled spirits, directly or indirectly or
through an affiliate: ...
(e) Labeling
To sell'or ship or deliver for sale or shipment, or otherwise introduce in
interstate or foreign commerce, or to receive therein, or to remove
from customs custody for consumption, any distilled spirits, wine, or
malt beverages in bottles, unless such products are bottled, packaged
and labeled in conformity with such regulations, to be prescribed by the
Secretary of the Treasury, with respect to packaging, marking, branding, and labeling and size and fill of container... (2) as will provide the
consumer with adequate information as to the identity and quality of
the products, the alcoholic content thereof (except that statements of,
or statements likely to be considered as statements of, alcoholic content
of malt beverages are prohibited unless required by State law and except that, in case of wines, statements of alcoholic content shall be required only for wines containing more than 14 per centum of alcohol
by volume), the net contents of the package, and the manufacturer or
bottler or importer of the product; ...
(f) Advertising
To publish or disseminate or cause to be published or disseminated
by radio broadcast, or in any newspaper, periodical or other publication
or by any sign or outdoor advertisement or any other printed or graphic
matter, any advertisement of distilled spirits, wine, or malt beverages, if
such advertisement is in, or is calculated to induce sales in, interstate or
foreign commerce, or is disseminated by mail, unless such advertisement is in conformity with such regulations, to be prescribed by the
Secretary of the Treasury . . . (2) as will provide the consumer with

adequate information as to the identity and quality of the products advertised, the alcoholic content thereof (except the statements of, or
statements likely to be considered as statements of, alcoholic content of
malt beverages and wines are prohibited), and the person responsible
for the advertisement ....
27 U.S.C. §§ 205(e)(2), 205(f)(2) (1988).
The BATF asserted that in legislating the Act, Congress was concerned with the
effect strength wars would have on both the brewing industry and the consuming
public. See Coors , 944 F.2d at 1547-48. The BATF further professed that the legislature believed that the Act would prevent strength wars and would result in the production of lower alcohol-content beer. See id. at 1548.
Before the passage of the Act in 1935, Congressman Cullen, Chairman of the
Committee on Ways and Means, appeared before the House of Representatives. See
79 CONG. REc. 11,713 (1935). Interestingly, he testified that the main goals of the Act
encompassed both protecting a source of revenue for the federal government and
preventing a resurgence of the problems evident in the liquor industry prior to and
immediately following Prohibition. See id. at 11,714. Congressman Cullen further
stated that the Act was formulated as a response to the need to protect consumers
from members of the liquor industry who, through unfair trade practices and dishonest labeling and advertising, would attempt to take advantage of the ignorance of the
consuming public. See id. When discussed by the members of the House of Representatives, the prohibition on "unfair and unlawful trade practices" included a ban on
deceptive names. See id. Furthermore, under the proposal for the Act, the government's control embraced a requirement for advertising and labeling regulations
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In July 1987, Coors filed a complaint in the United States District Court for the District of Colorado, claiming that §§ 205(e) (2)
and 205 (f) (2) unconstitutionally infringed on the company's right
to free speech.2 7 In an unreported opinion, the district court held
that these sections of the Act violated the First Amendment; accordingly, the Court granted summary judgment in favor of Coors
and enjoined the BATF from enforcing the restrictions at issue.2 8
On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth
designed to thwart deception of the consuming public by alcohol manufacturers. See
id. Congressman Cullen, however, failed to mention the prevention of strength wars
as a motive for enacting the Act at any point during the debate in the House of Representatives. See id. at 11,714-38.
The brief submitted to the Supreme Court by Coors stressed the lack of Congressional history regarding the prevention of strength wars. See Respondent's Brief,
Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co., No. 93-1631, 1994 WL 509885, at *11-15 (U.S. 1994).
Coors also pointed out that in 1935, the year the Act was enacted, brewers lacked the
technical capabilities to accurately determine the alcohol content of malt beverages.
See id. at *12-13. The omission of this information on product labels, Coors claimed,
was an attempt to protect the consumer from inaccurate content information. See id.
at *13 & n.10. Coors also pointed out that the BATF, in accord with its own position,
had previously asserted the view that the labeling ban was unnecessary and lacked
utility in the goal of preventing strength wars. See id. at *21. The brief alleged that
the BATF publicly supported the repeal of the labeling ban, favored provisions allowing for alcohol content disclosure on malt beverage labels, and hinted to Coors
that a challenge to § 205(e)(2) might be appropriate. See id. Coors's position was
further reinforced by the recommendation by the United States Department of
Health and Human Services that all alcoholic beverages, beer and malt liquors included, clearly display the product's alcohol content on the label. See id. at *22.
In countering the government's asserted interest in preventing strength wars,
Coors argued that in states requiring the disclosure of alcohol content on malt beverage labels, strength wars were not problematic. See id. at *20. Coors, further refuting
the government's position, emphasized that in countries mandating malt beverage
alcohol level disclosures, including Australia, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France,
Germany, Greece, Holland, Ireland, Luxembourg, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal,
Spain, and the United Kingdom, strength wars had not developed among brewers.
See id.
27 See Coors 1, 944 F.2d at 1546. Coors filed suit against the Secretary of the Treasury and the Director of the BATF, claiming that the labeling and advertisement restrictions constituted a violation of the brewer's First Amendment right to freedom of
speech. See id. The Treasury and the Justice Department, on behalf of the BATF and
the executive branch, conceded that both restrictions unconstitutionally infringed
upon the First Amendment. See id. The House of Representatives, however, believing
in the constitutionality of the statutory sections, intervened as a party to assert its
position. See id. The district court, upon motion by both parties, granted summary
judgment in favor of Coors. See id. Following the district court decision, both the
Treasury and the House defended the sections as constitutional. See id. The House
later withdrew, leaving only the BATF to defend the challenged statutes. See Petitioner's Brief, Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co., No. 93-1631, 1994 WL 412675, at ii (U.S.
1994).
28 See Coors I, 944 F.2d at 1546.
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Circuit reversed the district court's order.29 Applying the Central
Hudson test, the court of appeals, while acknowledging that the
speech at issue concerned a lawful activity and was not misleading, 30 asserted that the government possessed a substantial interest
in avoiding strength wars among the brewing companies.3 1 The
court determined, however, that the record did not furnish adequate evidence to ascertain whether the-Act's ban on alcohol con32
tent disclosure "directly advanced" the government's interest.
The court remanded the matter for further findings to determine
whether there existed a "direct advancement" and "reasonable fit"
between the objective of curbing strength wars and the restrictions
promulgated by the BATF.3 3
Following a more extensive gathering and review of the facts,
the district court upheld the ban on alcohol content disclosure in
beer advertising3 4 but maintained its prior position that prohibiting the printing of beer alcohol content on labels was unconstitutional.3 5 Employing the CentralHudson test, the court asserted that
29 See id. at 1554.
30 See id. at 1546-47. The court acknowledged that federal law considers the label-

ing and advertising of malt beverages to be lawful for First Amendment purposes and
that under the Twenty-first Amendment, the sale and consumption of alcohol is also
lawful. See id. at 1547. The Twenty-first Amendment provides that "[tihe eighteenth
article of amendment to the Constitution of the United States [Prohibition] is hereby
repealed ... [t]he transportation or importation into any State, Territory, or possession of the United States for delivery or use therein of intoxicating liquors, in violation of the laws thereof, is hereby prohibited." U.S. CONST. amend. XXI, §§ 1, 2.
31 See Coors , 944 F.2d at 1548-49. The court upheld this asserted interest as substantial. See id. at 1548. The court also noted that this interest fell within Congress's
power to regulate alcohol in interstate commerce to further fair competition and to
protect the consumer by ensuring that the brewing companies maintained a reasonable level of alcohol in beer products. See id. at 1548-49. But see supra note 25 (offering contradictory versions of the legislative history supporting the Act).
32 See Coors , 944 F.2d at 1549-50. The court stated that an "immediate connection" must exist between the asserted interest and the regulation at issue. Id. at 1549.
The court was also unable to find either an evident nexus between alcohol advertising
and strength wars or any evidence to indicate that the regulations did not "directly
advance" the government's interest. See id.
33 See id. at 1554. The court noted that at the time of the district court decision,
the Supreme Court had not yet decided the "reasonable fit" standard, as later announced in Board of Trustees v. Fox. See id. at 1552 (citing Board of Trustees v. Fox, 492
U.S. 469, 480 (1989)). The appellate court also determined that the analysis applied
by the lower court was too stringent; therefore, it remanded on this issue as well. See
id. at 1552-54; see also infra notes 93-95 and accompanying text (discussing the requirements of the "reasonable fit" standard).
34 See Adolph Coors Co. v. Bentsen, 2 F.3d 355, 357 (10th Cir. 1993) [hereinafter

Coors Hl].
35 See id. The district court found that the labeling ban set forth in § 205(e) (2) did
not directly advance the asserted governmental interest and that there did not exist a
"reasonable fit" between the regulation and the stated interest. See id. Upon deter-
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the government had a substantial interest in preventing potency
competitions among the brewing companies.3 6 The district court
held, however, that the § 205(e) (2) labeling ban did not "directly
advance" the government's goal. 7 Additionally, the court noted
that even if the section did advance the government's purported
goal, First Amendment jurisprudence would require a more "reasonable fit" between the ban and the goal."8 Consequently, the
court again found § 205(e) (2) to be an unconstitutional restraint
on commercial speech and invalidated the BATF's labeling ban.39
Dissatisfied with the district court's disposition of the matter,
the government appealed to the Tenth Circuit.4 ° The court of appeals, in affirming the decision of the district court, again acknowledged the substantial nature of the government's interest4 ' but
held that the labeling ban did not "directly advance" the government's goal.4 2 Relying heavily on recent Supreme Court precedent,4 3 the court emphasized that a challenged regulation must

advance a governmental interest in a "direct and material fashion." 4' The court found no such advancement4" and affirmed the
unconstitutionality of the labeling ban as an unlawful restraint on
mining that these two prongs of the Central Hudson analysis had not been met, the
district court ruled that the labeling ban was unconstitutional. See id.
36 See id. (citing Coors , 944 F.2d at 1547-49). The court of appeals pointed out
that in its remand to the district court, it instructed the court to review the direct
advancement and "reasonable fit" components of the Central Hudson analysis. See id.
As such, noted the Tenth Circuit, the district court findings were restricted to direct
advancement and "reasonable fit" analyses. See id.
37 See id.
38 See id.

39 See Coors II, 2 F.3d at 357.
40 See id. The government appealed both the district court judgment finding the
statutory sections unconstitutional and the order enjoining the BATF from enforcing
the labeling ban. See id. at 356.
41 See id. at 357-58. The classification of the alcohol content information as commercial speech and the finding of a substantial government interest were no longer at
issue when the case reached the court of appeals for the second time. See id. n.3.
42 See id. at 358. The court stated that the government was unable to show a link
between the dissemination of alcohol content information and strength wars. See id.
at 358-59. The court also announced that because the regulation at issue failed the
third prong of the CentralHudson test, it was unnecessary to review the "reasonable fit"
requirement. See id. at 359 n.6.
43 See id. at 357. Following the filing of the appellate brief by the government, the
Supreme Court decided Edenfield v. Fane, which further explained the "direct and
material" requirement of the third step of Central Hudson. See id. (citing Edenfield v.
Fane, 507 U.S. 761, 770-71 (1993)); see also infra notes 98-101 and accompanying text
(discussing the heightened "direct and material" advancement standard announced
in Edenfield).
44 See Coors , 2 F.3d at 357.
45 See id. at 358-59.
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commercial speech.46
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to consider whether the § 205 (e) (2) labeling ban unreasonably infringed
upon commercial speech.4 7 In an unanimous decision, the Court,
utilizing the Central Hudson test, affirmed the lower courts' decisions and held that although the government's interest in preventing strength wars among brewing companies was substantial, the
BATF's ban failed to advance that interest in a "direct and material
fashion."4 8 Justice Thomas, writing for the Court, explained that
certain provisions of the Federal Alcohol Administration Act directly conflicted with the goal sought to be achieved via a labeling
ban.4 9 The Justice also noted that numerous, less constitutionally
intrusive alternatives were available to the government.5" The
Court concluded that § 205 (e) (2) did not satisfy the CentralHudson
test and was therefore an unconstitutional infringement on comSee id. at 359.
See 114 S. Ct. 2671 (1994).
See Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co, 115 S. Ct. 1585, 1591-92 (1995). The Court held
that the government's interest in upholding the safety, health, and welfare of its citizenry via a ban preventing strength wars among the brewing companies was significant. See id. at 1591. As asserted by the Court, however, the government's method of
regulating the brewing companies proved too irrational to "directly and materially"
advance the interest. See id. at 1592. Consequently, the majority struck down the
statute and determined that § 205(e) (2) did not withstand First Amendment review.
See id. at 1594. Justice Thomas authored the Court's opinion, in which Chief Justice
Rehnquist and Justices Breyer, Ginsburg, Kennedy, O'Connor, Scalia and Souter
joined. See id. at 1587; see also infra notes 105-37 and accompanying text (detailing the
majority opinion in Coors). Justice Stevens, concurring in the judgment, provided his
own opinion. See Coors, 115 S. Ct. at 1587 (Stevens, J., concurring); see also infra notes
138-56 and accompanying text (detailing Justice Stevens's concurring opinion).
49 See Coors, 115 S. Ct. at 1592-93. Justice Thomas pointed out that § 205(e) (2)
prohibited the dissemination of alcohol content on beer labels while allowing this
information to be printed on wine and spirits labels. See id. at 1592. The Justice
further observed that brewers, although unable to identify higher potency beverages
with certain descriptive phrases, were permitted to classify such products as malt liquors, implicitly indicating the greater alcohol content. See id. at 1592-93. Justice
Thomas also noted that the federal restrictions on alcohol advertising applied only in
states that had affirmatively prohibited such information in advertisements. See id. at
1592. The Justice specifically pointed out that, conversely, the federal alcohol labeling ban applied only in states without a law requiring the disclosure of such information on product labels. See id. These blatant contradictions led the Court to find
§ 205(e) (2) unconstitutional. See id. at 1592-93.
50 See id. at 1593-94. The Court recognized Coors's suggestions that the government possessed alternatives to the labeling ban, including a direct limit on the
amount of alcohol contained in beer products, a restriction of the labeling ban to
only malt liquor products, and a ban on advertising efforts aimed at accentuating the
higher alcohol content of some beer products. See id. at 1593. The Court stated that
these options infringed less on Coors's First Amendment freedoms than § 205(e) (2).
See id. at 1593-94.
46
47
48
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mercial speech. 5 '
The United States Supreme Court first addressed commercial
speech in the decision of Valentine v. Chrestensen.52 In Valentine, a
case involving the distribution of handbills containing both an advertisement for submarine tours and a statement of public protest
regarding docking fees,5" the Supreme Court held that commercial
speech was not entitled to protection under the First Amendment.5 41 The Court explained that the First Amendment protected

communication of opinions and purely factual information on
streets and public thoroughfares, but the Constitution made no
such provision for speech that is commercial in nature. 55 Consequently, the Court concluded that this class of speech was subject
to whatever regulations the individual state legislatures saw fit to
impose.56
51 See id. at 1594. The Court announced that, although the government asserted a
substantial interest in the prevention of strength wars, the contradictory provisions of
the Act did not advance this interest in a "direct and material fashion." See id. The
Court further held that a "reasonable fit" between the regulation and the governmental interest did not exist, as less intrusive alternatives were available to the government. See id.
52 316 U.S. 52 (1942); see also Swecker, supra note 15, at 1531-32 (1995) (setting
forth Valentine as the genesis in the evolution of what has come to be recognized as
commercial speech).
53 See Valentine, 316 U.S. at 52-53. Chrestensen, the owner of a submarine that he
displayed and charged an admission fee for entry, prepared a printed handbill advertisement for the submarine. See id. Containing a printed admission fee, the handbill's purpose was to solicit visitors to the submarine. See id, at 53. When Chrestensen
attempted to distribute the handbill in the streets of New York City, he was advised by
Valentine, the police commissioner, that his actions violated section 318 of the Sanitary Code, which prohibited distribution of commercial and business advertising in
the streets. See id. Valentine advised Chrestensen that handbills devoted strictly to
information or a public protest were allowed. See id. Chrestensen then reformatted
his handbill, with one side containing his original advertisement minus the admission
fee information, and the other side protesting the New York City Dock Department's
actions in denying him wharfage privileges at a city pier for his submarine. See id.
Prior to distributing these handbills, the police advised Chrestensen that the handbills violated the city code. See id. Chrestensen, however, continued with his distribution plans and, as a result, he was arrested for violation of Sanitary Code section 318.
See id.
54 See id. at 54. The Court, while noting that the state and local governments possessed the power to regulate free speech in the public's interest, determined that
these regulations could not unduly burden or prohibit such information or opinions
from being shared with others. See id. The Court further emphasized that the Constitution imposed no similar restriction on those governments for regulations pertaining
to "purely commercial advertising." See id. The Valentine Court thereby concluded
that commercial speech was not entitled to protection under the First Amendment.
See id.
55 See id, at 55.
56 See id. at 54-55. The Court specifically stated that "[w]hether, and to what extent, one may promote or pursue a gainful occupation in the streets, to what extent
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In the 1976 decision of Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc.,5 7 the next significant step in
the evolution of commercial speech, the Supreme Court reversed
Valentine and held that the First Amendment protected purely commercial speech.5 8 Virginia State Board of Pharmacy involved a Virginia statute that proscribed the advertisement of prescription
drug prices by licensed pharmacists.5 9 The majority, recognizing
that these advertisements qualified as commercial speech,6" held
that speech of a commercial nature was not completely outside the
free speech protections guaranteed by the First Amendment.6 1
The Court therefore concluded that the Virginia statute was constitutionally invalid.6 2
such activity shall be adjudged a derogation of the public right of user, are matters for
legislative judgment." Id. at 54. The Court also noted that the true question at issue
involved a determination as to what extent a state would allow advertisers to interfere
with the intended use of the highways and thoroughfares by law-abiding citizens. See
id. at 54-55.
57 425 U.S. 748 (1976).
58 See id. at 761-62. The Court acknowledged the view that the kind of speech that
would not be afforded First Amendment protection must be distinguished by the content of the speech and that commercial speech could not automatically fall into the
no-protection category. See id. The Court further observed that protection could be
given to "purely factual matter[s] of public interest." Id. at 762.
59 See id. at 749-52. The statute at issue, § 54-524.35 of the Virginia Annotated
Code, deemed it unprofessional conduct for a state licensed pharmacist to publish,
advertise or promote, "'directly or indirectly, in any manner whatsoever, any amount,
price, fee, premium, discount, rebate or credit terms for professional services or for
drugs containing narcotics or for any drugs which may be dispensed only by prescription."' Id. at 750 n.2 (quoting VA. CODE ANN. § 54-524.35 (Michie 1974)). Virginia
viewed the practice of pharmacy as affecting the general health, safety, and welfare of
the state citizenry and therefore deemed it subject to regulations geared toward the
preservation of professional standards. See id. at 750-51. The Commonwealth thus
forbade the advertising or any other form of dissemination of information relating to
the prices of prescription drugs. See id. at 752.
60 See id. at 758-59. The Court suggested that because the statute at issue concerned the advertising of price information, the speech under consideration properly
qualified as commercial speech. See id.
61 See id. at 759. The Court noted that following the decision in Breard v. Alexandria, there had never been a refusal to provide protection to speech on the basis that
the speech was of a commercial nature. See id. (citing Breard v. Alexandria, 341 U.S.
622 (1951)). Furthermore, the Court reiterated the view set forth in Bigelow v. Virginiathat commercial speech is not an unprotected category. See id. at 759-60 (citing
Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809, 825-26 (1975)). The court espoused that "'the relationship of speech to the marketplace of products or of services does not make it
valueless in the marketplace of ideas."' Id. at 760 (quoting Bigelow, 421 U.S. at 82526).
62 See Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council Inc., 425
U.S. 748, 773 (1976). The Court held that a state may not completely ban the distribution of truthful information about legal activity simply because the state fears the
effect such information may have upon its recipients. See id.
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The Court, however, acknowledged that the protection of
commercial speech was not without its limits. 6 3 The majority, while
noting that reasonable time, place, and manner restrictions often
advance legitimate interests, 64 asserted that states could regulate
misleading or false speech and commercial speech relating to illegal activities." The Court further emphasized that although individual states possess the power to regulate professional conduct,
such regulations may not impede 66on society's interest in the "free
flow of commercial information."
Building on the protections afforded commercial speech in
Virginia State Board of Pharmacy, Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp.
v.Public Service Commission67 proved to be a landmark decision in
the development of the modem commercial speech doctrine.68 By
establishing a four-part analysis for commercial speech issues, the
See id. at 770. The majority emphasized that the Court's opinion did not present
the view that commercial speech could never be regulated. See id. at 770-71.
64 See id. at 771. The Court noted that in the past it had approved advertising
regulations as long as the regulations were justified on a basis other than the content
of the speech at issue; served a significant state interest; and provided sufficient alternative methods for communicating the same information. See id. Justice Blackmun,
writing for the majority, pointed out that the Virginia statute singled out speech relating to a particular subject and completely prohibited the dissemination of such information. See id.
65 See id. Dishonest speech, as highlighted by the Court, whether or not commercial in nature, had never been afforded protection under the First Amendment. See
id. (citing Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 340 (1974); Konigsberg v. State
Bar, 366 U.S. 36, 49 & n.10 (1961)). The Court also noted that commercial speech
may be subject to regulation when the underlying transaction of the speech is illegal.
See id. at 772 (citing Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Human Relations Comm'n, 413 U.S. 376,
388-89 (1973)).
66 See id. at 770. Thus, as enunciated by the Court, although Virginia was free to
regulate the pharmaceutical profession in whatever manner it deemed necessary, the
Commonwealth could not perpetuate consumer ignorance via statutes similar to the
one at issue. See id.; see also supra note 3 (noting the importance to consumers of
recognizing First Amendment protections for commercial speech).
67 447 U.S. 557 (1980).
68 See Elisabeth Alden Langworthy, Note, Time, Place or Manner Restrictions on Commercial Speech, 52 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 127, 128-29 (1983) (comparing the four-part test
enunciated in CentralHudson to the analysis traditionally used by the Court in examining time, place, or manner restrictions on noncommercial speech). The Central Hudson test and the method of review utilized in regard to time, place, or manner
restrictions on noncommercial speech share the conditions that the governmental
interest set forth must be substantial; the restriction at issue must be narrowly tailored; and the restriction must directly advance the government's interest. See id. at
138; see alsoJeffrey L. Harrison, Public Utilities in the Marketplace of Ideas: A "Fairness"
Solutionfor a Competitive Imbalance, 1982 Wis. L. REv. 43, 44-45 (1982) (theorizing that
the decision in CentralHudson,coupled with the monopolistic market position held by
utility companies, raised the utility companies into that realm of protected speech
occupied by broadcasters, while not imposing on the utility companies the same fairness obligations required of broadcasters).
63
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Court demonstrated that the freedom granted this category of
speech was not absolute6 9 and that the governmental power to regulate was greater than a ° simple reading of Virginia State Board of
7
Pharmacy might suggest.
The Central Hudson Court reviewed the constitutionality of a
ban on promotional advertising by electric utility companies 7 1 and
found that the information sought to be conveyed was neither false
69 See Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 566. The test set out by the Court involved four
steps: first, the speech at issue must fall within the protection of the First Amendment,
namely the commercial speech "must concern lawful activity and not be misleading;"
second, the asserted governmental interest must be substantial; third, analyzed only if
the first two steps were satisfied, the regulation must "directly advance" the government's substantial interest; and fourth, the regulation at issue must not be "more
extensive than necessary" to accomplish the government's goal. Id. Consistent with
the third step, a regulation that advances the state's interest in an indirect manner
will not be upheld. See id. at 564. Additionally, to meet the fourth step, the restriction
must be "narrowly drawn" and cannot be excessive; if a more limited restriction would
accomplish the same interest, the restriction will not survive scrutiny. See id. at 565.
The Court acknowledged, however, that although commercial speech merits some
constitutional protection, it is of less importance than other forms of protected
speech. See id. at 563 n.5.
70 See id. at 565-66. A government, the Court enunciated, may regulate commercial speech with narrowly drawn restrictions, provided that the restrictions reach only
the interest asserted by the government. See id. The Court further explained that the
government could regulate speech constituting a danger to a substantial state interest.
See id. at 564. If there are no less restrictive means for regulating the speech and the
speech relates to unlawful activity or proves to be deceptive, the Court asserted, the
government may completely ban the commercial speech. See id. at 563-64.
71 See id. at 558-60. Due to energy shortages in December 1973, which engendered
a concern that the New York utility system would not be able to meet consumer fuel
demands for the winter of 1973-74, the Public Service Commission of New York mandated that the state electric utilities stop all advertising advocating the use of electricity. See id. at 558-59. Three years later, the shortage had ceased and the Commission
solicited input from the public regarding the desirability of continuing the ban on
"promotional advertisements." See id. at 559. Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp.
objected to the ban, claiming that it violated the corporation's First Amendment
rights. See id. After review of submitted consumer comments, the Commission allowed the continuation of the ban and set forth its formal position on advertising in a
policy statement issued in February 1977. See id.
The Commission stated that it would permit "informational" advertising, defined
as advertising "not clearly intended to promote sales" and specifically encouraging
shifts in the usage of electricity to off-peak times. Id. at 560. The Commission, however, expressly prohibited promotional advertising, defined as "advertising intended
to stimulate the purchase of utility services." Id. at 559. The trial court, intermediate
appellate court, and Court of Appeals of New York all upheld the restriction as constitutional. See Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 390 N.E.2d
749, 757-58 (N.Y. 1979) [hereinafter Central Hudson II]; Central Hudson Gas & Elec.
Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 407 N.Y.S.2d 735, 737-38 (N.Y. App. Div. 1978) [hereinafter CentralHudson 1]. The courts explained that based on the fact that the utility
companies operated as a monopoly, consumers did not need information to make an
informed decision. See Central Hudson 1, 390 N.E.2d at 757-58; Central Hudson I, 407
N.Y.S.2d at 737-38. The Court of Appeals of New York further noted that allowing
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nor misleading and did not concern an unlawful activity. 72 The
Court thus concluded that the advertising at issue fell within the
realm of expression protected by the First Amendment. 7 The
Court further determined that the government's interest in conserving energy constituted a substantial state interest7'and that the
ban "directly advanced" that interest. 75 The majority then struck
down the regulatory ban, demonstrating that the restrictions were
more extensive than necessary to achieve the government's desired
76
goal.

promotional advertising would only serve to make the energy crisis worse. See Central
Hudson II, 390 N.E.2d at 757-58.
72 See Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 563-66; see also supra note 3 (discussing the requirement that commercial speech be neither false nor misleading).
73 See Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 566-68. The Commission never raised the issue
that the speech before the Court related to unlawful activity or could be deceptive.
See id. at 566. The Court of Appeals of New York questioned, based on the utility's
monopoly status, whether Central Hudson's advertisements fell within the category of
commercial speech. See Central Hudson II, 390 N.E.2d at 757. Writing for the Central
Hudson majority, Justice Powell, although never expressly stating that Central Hudson's speech constituted commercial speech, refuted the arguments of the lower
court that commercial speech can be barred when it "convey[s] little useful information." CentralHudson, 447 U.S. at 566-67. TheJustice then proceeded into the second
step of the Central Hudson analysis, thereby implicitly recognizing the speech's commercial status. See id. at 568-69.
74 See Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 568. The Commission actually set forth two interests as the rationale for the advertising restriction. See id. The first involved the goal
of energy conservation, which the Court recognized as substantial in light of the dependence of the American public on energy resources beyond the nation's control.
See id. The second interest asserted by the Commission dealt with the fairness and
efficiency of the rate structures of the utility companies. See id. The Court found this
interest to also constitute a substantial government interest. See id. at 569.
75 See id. The Court first addressed the rate structure interest and determined that
the relationship between the restriction on advertising and the assurance of equity
among utility rate structures was "at most, tenuous." See id. Justice Powell stated that
any impact the restriction might have had on rates would be speculative, and "conditional and remote eventualities" were insufficient to directly advance the Commission's restriction. Id. The Court continued by examining the relation between the
regulation and energy conservation and found that an "immediate connection" existed. See id. Justice Powell observed that unless the restriction would impact Central
Hudson's sales, the utility company would never have raised the issue of a violation of
its First Amendment rights. See id. The Court therefore found a direct link between
the restriction and the goal of energy conservation and announced that the direct
advancement requirement of the third step of the analysis was satisfied. See id.
76 See id. at 569-71. The Court, upon reviewing the fourth step of the Central Hudson analysis, found that even though the government had a substantial interest in
conserving energy and the advertising restriction "directly advanced" that goal, there
was no evidence that a less restrictive regulation on advertising would not accomplish
the same end. See id. at 571. Justice Powell further noted that allowing the restriction
to stand in its present form would prevent Central Hudson from advertising those
methods whereby consumers could reduce their total electricity consumption. See id.
at 570. The Court also observed that the substantial goal of energy conservation was
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Posadas de Puerto Rico Associates v. Tourism Co.," however,
seemed to weaken the protection of commercial speech's citadel.7 8
The Posadas Court reviewed the constitutionality of a Puerto Rico
statute that prohibited the advertisement of specified types of casino gambling to residents of Puerto Rico, while allowing the gambling to be promoted to tourists.7 9 Employing the Central Hudson
test, the majority determined that the restriction was constitutional
because the government's substantial interest *in protecting the
health, welfare, and safety of its citizens was "directly advanced" by
the statute. 80 Additionally, the Court opined that Puerto Rico's restriction on domestic advertising by casinos was not overextensive,
as it would have no effect on the business interests of the gaming
establishments in attracting tourists.8 '
After acknowledging that gambling advertisements were
neither fraudulent nor misleading and concerned a lawful activity,82 the Posadas Court recognized the government's assertion that
not significant enough to justify suppressing speech that might also be utilized to
further ideas aimed at limiting the use of electricity. See id. at 570-71.
77 478 U.S. 328 (1986).
78 See id. at 344. The Court found that, although the speech in question was commercial in nature, the challenge to the First Amendment was improper as each prong
of the CentralHudson test was met. See id. This finding directly contradicted the deference given commercial speech in Central Hudson, just six years earlier. See Central
Hudson, 447 U.S. at 571-72.
79 See Posadas, 478 U.S. at 331-33. The Puerto Rico Legislature legalized certain
specified forms of gambling through its enactment of the Games of Chance Act of
1948 (the Chance Act). See id. at 331. The Chance Act's goal involved the further
development of tourism. See id.at 332. To that end, the legislature included a provision in the Chance Act that licensed gambling rooms were prohibited from advertising to or allowing use by the citizens of Puerto Rico. See id.As highlighted by the
Court, Regulation 76a-1(7), pursuant to its amendment in 1971, stated that "'[nlo
concessionaire, nor his agent or employee is authorized to advertise the gambling
parlors to the public in Puerto Rico.'" Id. The regulation further provided that gambling could be advertised through media reaching beyond the citizenry of Puerto
Rico, subject to prior approval of the advertisement by the Tourism Development
Company. See id. at 332-33. The Superior Court of Puerto Rico interpreted the regulation narrowly, expressly prohibiting the advertisement of local casinos to the residents of Puerto Rico. See id. at 334-35.
80 See id.
at 340-42. The Court expressly acknowledged that the First Amendment
analysis in Posadaswould follow the guidelines set forth in Central Hudson. See id.at
340.
81 See id.
at 343. The Court recognized that as a result of the narrow construction
given to the statute by the Superior Court of Puerto Rico, the legislative restrictions
would not affect casino advertising aimed at the tourism trade but would apply only to
advertisements aimed at a domestic audience. See id. This narrow judicial construction effectively overcame an overbreadth challenge. See id.
82 See id.at 340-41. The Court limited the commercial speech at issue to the advertising of casino gambling where the advertisements were aimed at the residents of
Puerto Rico. See id.at 340.
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increased gambling among the island residents could foster an increase in Puerto Rico's crime and prostitution rates. 83 By enacting
the statute, the Court highlighted, the government sought to pro84
vide for the continued health, welfare, and safety of its citizens.
The majority held that this goal constituted a substantial state interest in satisfaction of CentralHudson's second step. 85
The Court continued by explaining that a statute prohibiting
specific activity thought to encourage illegal acts, namely casino
gambling, while allowing other forms of gambling by island residents, "directly advanced" the government's interest and thus satisfied the third prong of Central Hudson.8 6 Concluding its analysis,
the majority, based on the fact that the statute still allowed casinos
to advertise to tourists and only restricted advertisements of a specific type of gambling directed at a specific audience, determined
that the act was narrow enough to meet the requirement of Central
Hudson's fourth step.8 7
The Supreme Court emphasized that the factor distinguishing
Posadas from other commercial speech cases was that the Puerto
Rico legislature possessed the authority to ban gambling altogether, but had not done so. 8 The majority explained that the
83 See id. The legislature believed that increased gambling by the residents of Puerto Rico would lead to detrimental effects on the safety, health, and welfare of the
citizenry of the island. See id. Specifically, the legislature asserted, and the Court
acknowledged, adverse effects "'such as the disruption of moral and cultural patterns,
the increase in local crime, the fostering of prostitution, the development of corruption, and the infiltration of organized crime."' Id.
84 See Posadas, 478 U.S. at 341.
85 See id. Then-Justice Rehnquist, writing for the majority, even went so far as to
state that the Court had "no difficulty" in concluding that the interest set forth by the
legislature was substantial. See id.
86 See id. at 341-43. The legislature never expressed an interest in eliminating all
forms of gambling for the residents of Puerto Rico but, rather, only casino gambling.
See id. at 342. The legislature believed, and the Court found such belief reasonable,
that allowing the advertisement of casino gambling to the residents of the island
would increase the demand for casino gambling and lead to the inherent evils enumerated in the substantial interest analysis. See id. at 341-42. The Superior Court, in
its interpretation of the regulation, acknowledged that the types of gambling and
games of chance traditionally. found in Puerto Rican culture, such as horse racing,
"picas" (small games of chance at fiestas), the lottery, and cockfighting, were unaffected by the regulation. See id. at 342-43.
87 See id. at 343. The Court posited that the Superior Court of Puerto Rico's narrow construction of the regulation ensured that the restrictions on casino advertising
would affect only those advertisements aimed at Puerto Rican citizens and would not
adversely affect casino gambling promotions directed at the tourist industry. See id.
Then-Justice Rehnquist further announced that, due to this narrow construction, the
regulation was not overextensive and satisfied CentralHudson's fourth prong. See id. at
343-44.
88 Id. at 346. This authority, the Court asserted, allowed the legislature to regulate

1996]

NOTE

greater power to prohibit an activity necessarily includes the "lesser
power" to regulate that same activity.89
In Board of Trustees v. Fox,90 a case involving a university-instituted regulation preventing private business entities from using
school property, including dormitories, for commercial activities,
the Supreme Court clarified the requirements of Central Hudson's
fourth prong. 91 Upon questioning whether the government must
use the least restrictive method available for furthering its articulated interest,92 the Court determined that while a restriction must
be narrowly tailored to advance the government's substantial inter93
est, it need not necessarily be the least restrictive option available.
the activity in any way it deemed proper, including taking the "less intrusive" step of
continuing to allow the conduct while taking necessary measures, including restrictions on promotion, to reduce the demand for casino gambling. See id.
89 See id. at 345-46. In Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co., the BATF relied on and the
Supreme Court rejected this "lesser power to regulate" argument in its assertion that
the federal government possessed the power to regulate speech relating to alcohol.
See 115 S.Ct. 1585, 1589-90 n.2 (1995).
The Supreme Court's decision in 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island also raised
significant doubts about this rationale. 116 S. Ct. 1495, 1510-14 (1996). Part IV of the
opinion in that case, authored by Justice Stevens and joined by Justices Kennedy,
Thomas and Ginsburg, explicitly stated that the Justices declined to afford the Posadas
decision the deference usually given to prior Supreme Court decisions. See id. at
1511. Justice Stevens asserted that the PosadasCourt "erroneously performed the First
Amendment analysis." Id. Justice Stevens continued by positing that to be successful,
future cases that depend on the "vice" activity argument must also demonstrate a
prohibition of the commercial behavior under review. See id. at 1513-14. The Justice
further noted that the argument that the greater power to prohibit conduct included
the lesser power to regulate that conduct should no longer be followed, as it was both
illogical and inconsistent with "well-settled doctrine." See id. at 1512. Justice Stevens
delivered a specific reminder that this very argument was rejected by the Court during
the previous term in Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co. See id. These views, however, were
held by only four Justices and did not constitute part of the 44 Liquormart, Inc. opinion. See id. at 1500-01.
90 492 U.S. 469 (1989).
91 See id. at 471-72. The Court recounted that Resolution 66-156, established by
the State University of New York, set forth: "'No authorization will be given to private
commercial enterprises to operate on State University campuses or in facilities furnished by the University other than to provide for food, legal beverages, campus
bookstore, vending, linen supply, laundry, dry cleaning, banking, barber and beautician services and cultural events."' Id. American Future Systems, Inc. (AFS), a company engaged in the sale of housewares to college students through in-person
demonstrations at gatherings (a method similar to the well-known "Tupperware parties"), conducted such a demonstration in a student's dormitory room on SUNY's
Cortland campus. See id. at 472. Campus police informed the AFS representative that
she was violating the regulation. See id. When she refused to end her demonstration,
she was arrested and charged with loitering, trespass, and soliciting without a permit.
See id.
92 See id. at 471 (emphasis added).
93 See id. at 477-78. Writing for the Court, Justice Scalia pointed out that prior
decisions by the Court held that state restrictions could not be broader or more en-
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The Court articulated that the relation between the government's
interest in promoting an educational atmosphere and a safe, secure living environment, and the university regulation prohibiting
certain commercial activities need only be reasonable to pass constitutional scrutiny.9 4 The Court further explained that the nexus
between the government's interest and its regulatory scheme need
not meet a perfect or least-restrictive-means standard but, rather,
that the means employed by the government simply must be "narrowly tailored" to accomplish its desired goal.95
The Court clarified the explanations set forth in Fox in Edenfield v. Fane.9 6 The majority announced that while protection of a
client's privacy and maintenance of the independence of a certified accountant's independence in his or her professional capacity
were substantial state interests, a flat ban on in-person solicitation
by CPAs could not withstand constitutional review.9 7 Noting that
compassing than necessary to meet the state's substantial interests. See id. at 476. The
Justice specifically concluded, however, that in evaluating commercial speech, something "short of a least-restrictive-means standard" is required. Id. at 477.
94 See id. at 480. The majority upheld the Second Circuit's decision that the first
two steps of the CentralHudson test were satisfied. See id. at 475-76. The Court specifically stated that the speech proposed a lawful act and was not misleading, making it
subject to protection under the First Amendment. See id. at 475. The Court further
announced that the state's interest in "promoting an educational rather than commercial atmosphere on SUNY's campuses, promoting safety and security, preventing
commercial exploitation of students, and preserving residential tranquillity," was sufficient enough to meet the substantiality requirement. Id. The Court took issue, however, with the appellate court's remand instructions to the district court. See id. at 47576. As noted by the Supreme Court, the court of appeals had advised the district
court that the appropriate level of inquiry was the least-restrictive-means analysis. See
id. at 476. Justice Scalia stated, however, that the fit between the means and the end
need not be perfect but must be reasonable. See id. at 480. Further explaining the
.reasonable fit" requirement, the Justice announced that the method of meeting the
state's interest must be "'in proportion to the interest served,"' and have means that
are "narrowly tailored" to achieving the state's goal. See id. (quoting In re R.M.J., 455
U.S. 191, 203 (1982)).
95 See Fox 492 U.S. at 480; see also Keller, supra note 5, at 57-58 (suggesting that the
Fox Court's announcement of the "reasonable fit" standard significantly eased the
fourth step of the Central Hudson analysis and moved commercial speech back to the
position it held after Valentine); Lawlor, supra note 12, at 926 (theorizing that the
requirement of a reasonable, rather than a least-restrictive fit, moves the commercial
speech analysis closer to the rational basis standard).
96 507 U.S. 761 (1993).
97 See id. at 777. When accountant/respondent Fane moved to Florida and attempted to establish an accounting practice, he encountered a state Board of Accountancy regulation that prohibited certified public accountants (CPAs) from
engaging in in-person solicitation. See id. at 763-64. The regulation provided that a
CPA "'shall not by any direct, in-person, uninvited solicitation solicit an engagement
to perform public accounting services . . . where the engagement would be for a
person or entity not already a client of [the CPA], unless such person or entity has
invited such a communication."' Id. (quoting FLA. ADMIN. CODE ANN. r. 21A-
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the evils a regulation seeks to curb must be actual, 98 the Court determined that the government's conjecture and unsubstantiated
theories were inadequate to uphold the ban.99 The majority further explained that although the regulation must advance prevention of these harms in a "direct and material" way,'
to survive
Central Hudson scrutiny it need only be reasonably related to
achieving that goal. 10 1 Refuting the argument that the blanket prohibition was really a content-neutral time, place, and manner restriction on commercial speech, the Court stated that such a
regulation would still be required to advance a substantial government interest in a "direct and material fashion.""0 2 The Court held
that without those two essential elements, the regulation violated
24.002(2) (c) (1992)). Contending that this regulation impeded the establishment of
his professional practice, violating his First and Fourteenth Amendment rights, Fane
sued the Board of Accountancy. See id. at 764. The Board, acting in a governmental
capacity, asserted that the ban on solicitation was essential in maintaining the independence of accountants; in preventing "overreaching and vexatious conduct" by accountants; and in protecting the privacy interests of the citizens of Florida. See id. at
764-65. The Supreme Court held that personal solicitation qualifies as commercial
speech and is therefore afforded protection under the First Amendment. See id. at
765. Justice Kennedy, writing for the majority, stated that although the government
interests proved substantial, in the case of a flat ban, as in the instant case, the restriction must advance the state interest in a "direct and material" way. See id. at 767. The
Justice noted that this advancement requirement is necessary because flat bans often
inadvertently prohibit honest, nondeceptive information, which would be entitled to
First Amendment protection. See id. at 770-71. The Court ultimately determined the
CPA solicitation ban to violate Fane's right to free speech. See id. at 777.
98 See id. at 770-71. Additionally, the Court stated that a governmental body attempting to uphold a limit on commercial speech must also show that the state's limit
would lessen these harms to a material degree. See id. The Court explained that the
burden of justifying a limit on commercial speech falls to the party attempting to
uphold the restriction, and the burden fails to be met if the party bases its justification
on "mere speculation or conjecture." See id. Looking to the "real harms" requirement, the Court stated that the affidavit of a former chairman of the accountancy
board promulgating the regulation, without the support of studies, anecdotal evidence or empirical data, failed to articulate anything beyond mere speculation of
potential harm. See id. at 771. Furthermore, in regards to the affidavit, the Court
stated it "contain[ed] nothing more than a series of conclusory statements that
add[ed] little if anything to the Board's original statement of its justifications." Id.
99 See id. at 770-71.
100 See id. at 770.
101 See Edenfield, 507 U.S. at 767. The Court relied on Fox, which held that a regula-

tion need be only reasonably tailored to achieving the asserted interest to withstand
Central Hudson review. See id. (citing Board of Trustees v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 480
(1989)). The Court noted that prophylactic regulations are always suspect in the area
of commercial speech and that precision is necessary in an area so closely associated
with the most fundamental freedoms afforded Americans. See id. at 777 (citing
NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 438 (1963)).
102 See id. at 773. The Court suggested that even if such an all-encompassing ban
could be considered a content-neutral time, place, and manner restriction on commercial speech, the restriction still must achieve a substantial state interest in a "direct
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10 3

Recently, the United States Supreme Court further clarified
the parameters of the commercial speech doctrine in Rubin v. Coors
Brewing Co. .104 In Coors, the Supreme Court examined whether a
federal regulation prohibiting the printing of alcohol content on
beer product labels unconstitutionally infringed on the brewing
company's First Amendment right to free speech.10 5 Specifically,
the Court reviewed whether the ban advanced the government's
interest of preventing strength wars in a "direct and material fashion"106 and whether a "reasonable fit" existed between the govern10 7
ment's stated interest and the legislative restriction.
Justice Thomas, writing for the majority, prefaced the Court's
opinion with a review of the relevant statutory provisions and prior
commercial speech case law. 108 The Justice began by acknowledgand effective" manner. See id. (quoting Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781,
800 (1989)).
103 See id. at 774-77. Even though the interests asserted proved substantial, the
Court found that the restriction on in-person CPA solicitation did not advance those
interests in a "direct and material fashion." See id. at 777. Without this intimate and
significant relation to the asserted state interests, the restriction failed to qualify as a
valid reasonable time, place, and manner regulation. See id. at 773. Turning to the
reasonable time, place, or manner restriction analysis, the Court determined that,
although the state possessed within its legitimate powers an interest in regulating solicitation by CPAs, the restriction at issue lacked the requisite "close and substantial"
relation to the state's interests. See id.
The Supreme Court rejected the Board's reliance on Ohralik as justification for
its prophylactic restrictions on the grounds that in-person solicitation by CPAs typically does not involve the adverse conditions surrounding solicitation by attorneys. See
id. at 774-75; see also Peter E. Millspaugh, The Supreme Court and State Restraints of CPA
Business Solicitation, 11 AKRON TAX J. 103, 118 (1995) (distinguishing Edenfield from
the Court's decision in Ohralik on the grounds that unlike attorneys, whose training
emphasizes techniques of persuasion, the education of a CPA stresses "independence
and objectivity"); supra note 12 (detailing the Ohralik decision).
104 115 S. Ct. 1585, 1594 (1995).
105 See id. at 1588.
106 See id.
107 See id.
108 See id. at 1588-89. Justice Thomas first addressed the Twenty-first Amendment
and the enactment of the Federal Alcohol Administration Act of 1935. See id. at 1588.
The Justice specifically noted the statutes setting forth the federal labeling ban and
defining "malt beverages." See id. at 1588-89 (citing 27 U.S.C. §§ 205(e) (2), 211(a)(7)
(1988)). The Court also reviewed the implementation provisions of the Act. See id.
(citing 27 C.F.R. § 7.26(a)-(d) (1994) (setting forth the rules pertaining to the disclosure on product labels of the alcohol content of malt beverages); 27 C.F.R. § 7.29 (f)
(1994) (prohibiting the use of "full strength," "strong," and similar descriptive words
indicating increased alcohol content on product labels unless mandated by state law;
allowing product labels to contain descriptive terms evidencing reduced alcohol content; and allowing statements of alcohol content in accordance with the guidelines set
forth in 27 C.F.R. § 7.71)). While Coors was pending, the BATF suspended § 7.26 in
accordance with the decision by the district court. See id. at 1589 n.1; see also 58 Fed.
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ing that both parties viewed the information found on beer labels
to be commercial speech.1" 9 Therefore, the majority quickly disposed of the first issue under the CentralHudson test, recognizing
that the information Coors sought to publicize constituted commercial speech as it was an honest, substantiated, and nondeceptive statement of factual information regarding the amount of
alcohol contained in Coors's beers. 110 Having accepted the parties' common stance, Justice Thomas stated that the requirement
that commercial speech concern legal activity and be nonmisleading had been met, thus satisfying Central Hudson's first
requirement."'
The Justice next discussed the substantiality of the interests asserted by the government.1 1 2 The Court found the first interest
advanced by the government-preventing strength wars among
brewing companies-to be substantial enough to justify
§ 205(e) (2).113 Justice Thomas explained that the government's
Reg. 21228 (1993) (suspending indefinitely 27 U.S.C. § 7.26 and establishing interim
rules setting forth guidelines for brewers' disclosure of alcohol content information
on the labels of their malt beverage products). This suspension allowed disclosure of
alcohol content on product labels through the enactment of interim regulations. See
Coors, 115 S. Ct. at 1589 n.1; 27 C.F.R. § 7.71 (1994) (establishing the interim regulations for the disclosure of alcohol content information on malt beverage labels resulting from the lower courts' decisions in Coors).
Following a discussion of the relevant statutes and regulations, Justice Thomas
briefly reviewed the history of the Supreme Court's development of the commercial
speech doctrine. See Coors, 115 S. Ct. at 1589. TheJustice focused special attention on
Valentine, Virginia State Board of Pharmacy, and Central Hudson. See id.
109 See Coors, 115 S. Ct. at 1589. By assenting to the parties' stipulation that the
speech came within the commercial speech classification, the Court dispensed with
such determination and proceeded directly into the application of the CentralHudson
test. See id. But see id. at 1596 (Stevens, J., concurring) (arguing that the communication at issue in Coors was "truthful, unadorned, informative speech" and therefore
should not have been classified as commercial speech and afforded a lower level of
protection simply because it appeared on a product label); infra notes 148, 151 and
accompanying text (discussingJustice Stevens's view that the labeling ban qualified as
a content-based restriction on a protected category of speech).
110 See Coors, 115 S.Ct. at 1590. No disagreement existed between the parties, or
among the lower courts, that Coors sought to disclose only "truthful, verifiable, and
nonmisleading factual information" on the proposed labels. Id. As such, the Court
acknowledged this part of the analysis and moved into the substantiality and advancement analyses. See id.
111 See id.

112 See id. at 1590-91. The government asserted an interest in preventing strength
wars among the brewing companies and in facilitating efforts by the individual states
to regulate alcohol pursuant to the Twenty-first Amendment. See id.
113 See id. at 1591. The government stated that § 205(e)(2) promoted Congress's
goal of avoiding a competition based on potency among the brewing companies by
preventing consumers from choosing a beer based solely upon a higher alcohol. See
id.
at 1590. Justice Thomas noted the Court's agreement with the court of appeals, at

346

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 27:319

interest in safeguarding the general citizenry's health, safety, and
welfare was sufficiently important to allow the labeling ban to withstand review. 1 4 The Court then rejected the second interest set
forth by the government-that § 205(e) (2) eased the burden of
alcohol regulation on individual states desiring to enact similar labeling restrictions.' 1 5 Although this second interest failed, the majority stated that protecting the welfare of the public was significant
1 6
enough to allow the analysis to proceed to the next level. 1
Having found a substantial governmental interest, Justice
Thomas then examined how effectively the means used to further
the government's interest related to its goal." 7 Relying on Edenfield,'" 8 the Court reiterated the view that the government bears the
burden of demonstrating that a federal regulation "directly and
both the first and second reviews, that the prevention of strength wars among brewers
constituted a substantial government interest. See id. at 1591.
114 See id. The majority noted that if brewers were allowed to compete on the basis
of product strength, the alcoholism level in the United States, as well as the social
costs accompanying the condition, could increase. See id. at 1591. The government
asserted that restricting the disclosure of alcohol content on beer products would
decrease the extent to which beer is purchased on the basis of such information. See
id. at 1590.
115 See Coors, 115 S. Ct. at 1591. The Court expressed the view that the states already
possessed the power necessary to regulate and control alcohol within their borders,
subject to constitutional restrictions that also guide the federal government. See id.
Section 205(e)(2) restricted the disclosure of a product's alcohol content only in
those states without rules requiring that such information be provided by brewing
companies. See id. The government suggested that by upholding the labeling ban,
the federal government would assist those states interested in pursuing similar legislation by taking care of the matter for them. See id. The government hypothesized that
the situation of beer drinkers traveling across state borders to purchase beer they
believed higher in alcohol content would thereby be avoided. See id. The government further asserted that § 205(e) (2) would "facilitate[ ]" efforts by individual states
to regulate alcohol pursuant to the Twenty-first Amendment. See id. The Court held,
however, that this rationale failed to qualify as a substantial interest under Central
Hudson. See id.
116 See id. The Court prefaced its review of the government's protection of the
safety, health, and welfare of the American public with a reiteration of the interest
asserted by the government in Posadas. See id. As in Posadas,where the Court found
that a restriction on casino gambling promulgated to protect health, safety, and welfare of the citizenry of Puerto Rico was substantial, Justice Thomas similarly noted
that the BATF labeling ban aimed at protecting those same interests sufficiently constituted a substantial government interest. See id. The Court acknowledged that were
strength wars to occur, there was no evidence that the social problems inherent in
increased alcohol consumption would not arise. See id.
117 See id. at 1591-94.
118 See id. at 1591-92. Justice Thomas specifically pointed to the "directly advances"
analysis in Edenfield and noted that the Court had addressed the issue just two terms
prior to deciding Coors. See id. (citing Edenfield v. Fane, 507 U.S. 761, 767 (1993)); see
also supra notes 96-103 and accompanying text (discussing Edenfield at greater length).
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materially" advances a substantial government interest.' 1 9 The majority expressed that the disparate federal labeling,1 2 ° disclosure,

and advertising regulations121 among different categories of alcohol sufficiently demonstrated that § 205(e) (2) did not "directly

and materially" prevent strength wars. 122 Addressing the apparent
123
inconsistencies in the federal alcohol regulatory structure, Justice Thomas concluded that these contradictions brought into
question the government's motivation in enacting and perpetuat119 See id. at 1592. The Court emphasized that in reviewing the third step of the
CentralHudson analysis, the government must demonstrate that the regulation at issue
advanced the state's interest "in a direct and material" way. See id. (quoting Edenfield,
U.S. 507 at 767). Justice Thomas also reiterated the view that this "directly advanced"
requirement comprised a critical element of the CentralHudson analysis. See id.
120 See Coon, 115 S. Ct. at 1592-93. The Court noted that while disallowing the
printing of alcohol content on beer labels, governmental regulations allowed the
same information to be disseminated on the labels of distilled spirits and required it
on the labels of wines containing greater than 14% alcohol. See id. at 1592; 27 C.F.R.
§ 5.37 (1994) (promulgating the mandatory and optional alcohol content information appearing on the product labels of distilled spirits, as well as the acceptable tolerance levels for alcohol losses that could occur during the bottling process); 27 C.F.R.
§ 4.36 (1994) (establishing the minimum level of alcohol in wine at which the alcohol
content must be disclosed and the content-related information required to be printed
on the product labels of wines). The majority also noted that the BATF, while disallowing brewing companies from designating higher alcohol-content beverages
through the use of "colorful" terms, had allowed brewers to designate these beverages
by using the term "malt liquor." See Coors, 115 S. Ct. at 1592-93; 27 C.F.R. § 7.29(f)
(1994) (barring the use of descriptive terms indicating high potency, unless required
by the laws of the individual state). Justice Thomas stated that if the government's
true purpose in not disclosing the alcohol content of beer on the product label was to
prevent strength wars, then allowing designation of these higher-potency liquors
should have also been prohibited. See Coors, 115 S. Ct. at 1593.
121 See Coors, 115 S.Ct. at 1592. The Court noted that while § 205(e) (2) prohibited
printing alcohol content information on beer labels unless required by state law,
§ 205(f) (2) required just the opposite standard-that unless affirmatively banned by
state law, alcohol content was allowed to be published by brewers in beer advertisements. See id; 27 U.S.C. § 205(f)(2) (1988) (banning the dissemination of alcohol
content information in advertising); 27 C.F.R. § 7.50 (1994) (establishing the application guidelines for § 205(f) (2)). The Court observed that at the time of the decision,
only 18 states affirmatively prohibited this information in beer ads. See Coors, 115 S.
Ct. at 1592. Therefore, as pointed out by the Court, the majority of the states allowed
this information in advertisements but not on the actual product label. See id. Justice
Thomas further stated that the Court viewed advertisements as a more persuasive
component of a potential strength war than product labels, indicating the irrationality
of the government's scheme for prevention. See id.
122 See Coors, 115 S. Ct. at 1592-93. The Justice noted that the irrationality of the
government regulations led to a finding contradictory to the "direct and material"
advancement requirement of the Central Hudson test. See id.
123 See id.; see also supranote 120 (noting that while the government's asserted interest was the prevention of strength wars through nondisclosure of alcohol content in
beer, the government allowed that same information to be printed on wine and spirits
labels and permitted identification of beverages with higher alcohol content through
use of the term "malt liquor").
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ing the labeling ban.12 4 The Justice noted that the lower courts, in
considering the issue of strength wars among the brewing companies, were unable to ascertain any credible evidence that disclosure
of alcohol content would encourage such a result. 12 5 Justice
Thomas further commented that the government failed to offer
any persuasive evidence that the sixty-year-old labeling ban had any
effect on stifling strength wars. 126 Consequently, the unanimous
Court determined that § 205(e) (2) inadequately met the level of
advancement27necessary to satisfy the third prong of the Central
Hudson test.'
The majority then examined Central Hudson's fourth inquiry,
involving the reasonableness of the fit between the BATF's regulation and the goal it purported to advance. 1 28 Upon considering
several alternatives to § 205(e) (2),129 the Court concluded that all
See Coors, 115 S. Ct. at 1593. The Court expressed that in light of the inconsistencies and contradictions in the regulatory scheme, when viewed as a whole, the
articulated motivation of the government in enacting these regulations was questionable. See id. Justice Thomas reiterated that the government's goal was valid but noted
that the regulations could not directly and materially advance the asserted goal when
promulgated guidelines contravened one another. See id. The Justice further noted
that the government's scheme proved "puzzling" and did not appear to promote the
government's intended goal. See id.
125 See id. The Court followed the conclusion of the district court in announcing
that the type of publication at issue would have little to do with the varieties of advertising thought to promote strength wars. See id. Justice Thomas further noted that
the inconsistencies in the Act would negate any effect the labeling ban might have
had and would have resulted in the dearth of evidence available to support the government's claim. See id.
126 See id. The majority, though not articulating any specific examples, stated that
any one of a number of other factors may have led to the absence of a strength war at
any time over the past 60 years. See id. Justice Thomas conceded that the government
offered anecdotes and "educated guesses" to suggest the existence of a strength war
but stated that the Court found these "various tidbits" insufficient to outweigh the
overall insensibility of the regulatory scheme. See id.
127 See id. at 1592.
128 See id. at 1593-94. Essentially, the Court's examination of the fourth prong of
Central Hudson constituted dicta, inasmuch as the BATF regulation had failed the
test's third step and was therefore already invalid. See id. at 1592-93.
129 See Coors, 115 S. Ct. at 1593. Coors's suggestions consisted of a prohibition on
advertising efforts;aimed at highlighting products with a higher alcohol content, a
limit on § 205(e) (2) for application only to malt liquors, and a direct limit on the
amount of alcohol a brewer could use to manufacture its product. See id. at 1593-94.
The government's brief to the Coors Court acknowledged alternatives suggested
by the Tenth Circuit. See Petitioner's Brief, Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co., No. 93-1631,
1994 WL 412675, at *31 (U.S. 1994). These options consisted of a restriction on the
labels of only malt liquor products; leaving other malt beverages subject to disclosure
provisions similar to those applicable to wine and distilled spirits; and a ban on only
descriptive terms and phrases indicative of heightened alcohol content. See id. Both
of these alternatives would allow a numerical statement disclosing alcohol content on
the labels of malt beverages. See id. The government's reply brief set forth the addi124
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the proffered suggestions would further the government's goal of
prevention and infringe less on Coors's First Amendment rights. 3 '
As a result, the majority determined that § 205(e) (2) was more
comprehensive than necessary and, as such, did not satisfy Central
31
Hudson's fourth prong. 1
Accordingly, the Court held that the information Coors
sought to disclose fell within that realm of commercial speech afforded protection and therefore could not be prohibited by the
federal labeling ban set forth in § 205(e) (2).2 Like the courts
below, Justice Thomas stressed that Coors sought to disclose only
truthful, nonmisleading information and that the government had
33
a substantial interest in preventing strength wars among brewers.
The Court thus agreed that the circumstances of the case satisfied
the first two steps of the four-part Central Hudson test. 1 34 Continuing the Central Hudson analysis, the majority announced that the
federal labeling ban did not advance the government's interest in a
"direct and material" way, as evidenced by the many contradictions
among sections of the same regulatory act.1 33 The Court, based on
the plethora of acceptable alternatives available to the government,
also determined that no "reasonable fit" between the ban and the
government's objective existed.' 36 Thus, the Supreme Court aftional suggestion of a tax on malt beverages directly related to the product's alcohol
content. See Petitioner's Reply Brief, Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co., No. 93-1631, 1994
WL 570303, at *19 n.19 (U.S. 1994).
130 See id. The Court, while refusing to acknowledge that any one particular option
presented by Coors was superior, noted that Coors's alternatives would have advanced
the goal of preventing strength wars while proving to be less of an intrusion on
Coors's First Amendment rights than the labeling ban. See id.
13' See id. at 1593-94.
132 See id. at 1590, 1594. The Court indicated that upon consideration of the Central
Hudson factors, § 205(e) (2) violated the protection granted to commercial speech by
the First Amendment. See id. This finding affirmed the holding of the Tenth Circuit
that § 205(e) (2) encroached upon Coors's freedom of speech and was therefore unconstitutional. See id. at 1594.
133 See id.at 1590-91.
134 See Coors, 115 S. Ct. at 1590. The acknowledgment by the parties that the speech
at issue fell within the realm of commercial speech, after being addressed initially by
the Court, was sufficient to satisfy Central Hudson's first step and therefore was not
mentioned at any later point in the Court's opinion. See id.; see also id. at 1594 (failing
to address the qualification of the speech as commercial speech in the summary of
the decision). Justice Thomas also reiterated that the government's interest in
preventing strength wars was substantial, satisfying the second step of the Central Hudson analysis. See id. at 1594.
135 See id.

136 See id. Justice Thomas announced that the existence of less restrictive alternatives precluded the finding that a "reasonable fit" existed between the labeling ban
and the prevention of strength wars. See id.; see also supra note 129 (summarizing the
alternatives presented to the Court for consideration).
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firmed the decision of the Tenth Circuit and invalidated
1 37
§ 205(e) (2) of the Federal Alcohol Administration Act.
Justice Stevens, concurring with the Court's judgment, agreed
with the majority view that the labeling ban did not advance the
government's goal of preventing strength wars.1 38 The Justice disagreed, however, with the analysis used by the majority to reach
that conclusion.1 3 9 Justice Stevens suggested that the Court, rather
than employing the Central Hudson test in this instance, should
have considered whether the commercial speech doctrine actually
applied to the Federal Alcohol Administration Act.14 ° The Justice
further explained that the statute at issue essentially kept consumers uninformed, a goal directly at odds with the purposes of free
speech. 141
Elaborating on the dictates of commercial speech,' 4 2 Justice
Stevens noted that the government may not only prohibit the disclosure of certain information 1 43 but may also require compulsory
disclosure of certain product information.' 4 The Justice characterized § 205 (e) (2) as unique in that it required the printing of the
alcohol content of a wine or spirit on the product's label while banSee Coors, 115 S. Ct. at 1594.
See id. (Stevens, J., concurring).
139 See id. The Justice authored his own opinion to express the belief that the unconstitutionality of § 205(e) (2) was even stronger than the majority opinion indicated. See id.
140 See id. The Justice stated that the commercial speech doctrine was not appropriate in this case. See id. Justice Stevens specifically asserted that the Act did not
prevent deceptive speech or shield consumers from the receipt of incomplete information and therefore did not fall within the classification of commercial speech. See
id.
141 See id. at 1594-95 (Stevens, J., concurring). Justice Stevens stated that the information sought to be disseminated by Coors consisted of merely an accurate informational statement on a product label of the contents of that product. See id. at 1595
(Stevens, J., concurring).
142 See Coors, 115 S. Ct. at 1594 (Stevens, J., concurring). The Justice emphasized
that not only does the First Amendment protect the right to speak, it protects the right
not to speak as well. See id. (emphasis added).
143 See id. The concurrence noted that when dealing with commercial speech, the
government possessed the ability to ban deceptive, misleading speech that would be
afforded protection in other situations. See id.
144 See id. The Justice noted that the government, in the area of commercial
speech, also enjoys the ability to require speakers to make disclosures that would not
ordinarily have been made voluntarily. See id. n.1 (Stevens, J., concurring) (citing 15
U.S.C. § 1333 (1988) (requiring that cigarette packages contain a "Surgeon General's
Warning" label); 21 U.S.C. § 343 (1988 & Supp. V 1993) (establishing food product
labeling requirements); 21 U.S.C. § 352 (1988 & Supp. V 1993) (delineating drug
77
product labeling requirements); 15 U.S.C. § e (1988) (compelling filing of a registration statement prior to selling securities)).
137

138
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145
ning the printing of that same information on a beer's label.
Justice Stevens posited that the goal of avoiding strength wars permitted requirements for the disclosure of information pertaining
to the known risks associated with alcohol consumption.' 4 6 The
Justice announced, however, that this goal would not justify suppressing nondeceptive, accurate information about the beer simply
47
because it was presented in a commercial setting.
Critical of the CentralHudson test and its impact on classifications of commercial and noncommercial speech, Justice Stevens
questioned the majority's determination that the statement sought
to be printed on labels by Coors actually constituted commercial
speech. 148 The Justice stated that a true description of commercial
speech should relate to the potentially deceptive effect that the
type of speech might have on consumers, thus rationalizing the
Court's historical view that commercial speech is entitled to less
than full First Amendment protection.1 4 9 Continuing, the concur145 See id. at 1594 (Stevens, J., concurring). Justice Stevens, viewing § 205(e) (2) as a
mix of "prohibitions and requirements," observed that the regulation prohibited the
printing of alcohol content information on the labels of particular malt beverages,
while demanding that same information to be disclosed on the wine labels. See id.
Justice Stevens further noted that the prohibition associated with beer labels was inconsistent with the First Amendment goal of avoiding the disclosure of incomplete or
inaccurate information to the consumer. See id. at 1595 (Stevens, J., concurring).
146 See id. at 1594-95 (Stevens, J., concurring). The justice conceded that disclosure
requirements detailing the harms and risks known to accompany alcohol consumption would be justified by the government's interest in averting any potentially negative consequences of strength wars. See id. Justice Stevens also stated that such a
disclosure provision would be justifiable on the basis that it would serve to prevent
consumers from purchasing, based on incomplete or inaccurate information, any
product they would not typically buy if they were aware of the truth. See id. at 1595
(Stevens, J., concurring).
147 See Coors, 115 S. Ct. at 1595. The Justice noted that in any other context the
honest statement of alcohol content would receive full constitutional protection. See
id. at 1594-95 (Stevens, J., concurring). The Justice asserted that without some reasoning tailored specifically to the commercial setting, the government should not be
allowed to restrict that same information merely because it appeared on a product
label. See id.
148 See id. at 1595 (Stevens, J., concurring). The Justice questioned the majority's
determination that the phrase "4.73% alcohol by volume" constituted commercial
speech. See id. The concurrence presented the notion that if the same information
were presented on the cover of a magazine produced by a nonprofit organization, the
majority would not classify it as commercial speech. See id. The Justice noted that the
Court's rationale may have been premised upon Coors's motivation to sell a product
based on the information it was disclosing or that what was being disclosed might
have induced people to buy Coors's products. See id. Justice Stevens maintained, however, that this rationale alone proved insufficient to make the speech less deserving of
the guarantees of the First Amendment. See id.
149 See id. The Justice asserted that a classification of speech as commercial should
be accompanied by an explanation of why that category is entitled to less than full
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rence explained that false commercial speech often prompts spontaneous action by consumers-usually without the necessary
resources to uncover the truth or falsity of the information upon
which they rely-thus justifying greater regulation of commercial
speech.15 ° Justice Stevens also suggested that the information
Coors sought to disclose was merely a truthful, informative statement regarding the content of one of its products and, as such,
§ 205(e) (2) should have been analyzed as a content-based restriction on a category of protected speech. 1
Justice Stevens concluded with a brief reminder of the Constitution's goals in allowing freedom of speech. 5 2 The Justice emphasized that the goals of the First Amendment's provisions for the
unrestricted flow of information included a well-informed public
and the generation of more speech.1 53 Justice Stevens asserted that
the statute at issue in the present case was in direct conflict with
those interests. 54 The concurrence also indicated that Congress
could have formulated less intrusive regulations to prevent
protection, namely the potential of the commercial speech to deceive. See id. at 1595
(Stevens, J., concurring). Justice Stevens further stated that restrictions on deceptive
speech that would not be tolerated in other speech classifications are justifiable in the
arena of commercial speech. See id. at 1596 (Stevens, J., concurring).
150 See id. The concurrence noted that the consequences of incomplete or inaccurate commercial speech can be devastating, resulting in the loss of savings by investors
or the purchase of dangerous or defective products by consumers. See id. Additionally, the Justice observed that commercial speech often prompts immediate action by
consumers, leaving no time for reflection on the information presented or for determining the truth or falsity of the information. See id.; see also supra note 3 (discussing
the dangers inherent in consumer action absent contemplation by the consumer of
the information provided-to him or her). Without this time for reflection, the Justice
pointed out, there is no opportunity to minimize the risks associated with deceptive
speech. See Coors, 115 S. Ct. at 1596 (Stevens, J., concurring). Justice Stevens then
synthesized these notions and explained that the potential for immediate detrimental
impact and the ability of the people disseminating the commercial information to
control its accuracy proved sufficient to allow greater govemmental regulation of
commercial speech. See id.
151 See Coors, 115 S. Ct. at 1596 (Stevens, J., concurring). Justice Stevens stated that
Coors, seeking to disclose only honest, informative speech on its labels, possessed a
constitutional right to provide the public with accurate information regarding its beer
products. See id. As such, the Justice, although not explicitly articulating the test to be
applied to § 205(e) (2), stated that the appropriate standard of review consisted of an
analysis as "stringent" as the one used for content-based restrictions on categories of
protected speech. See id. at 1596-97 (Stevens, J., concurring).
152 See id. at 1597 (Stevens, J., concurring). The justice pointed out that an "interest" in limiting the dissemination of accurate, honest information, due to a fear of
increased danger inherent with that knowledge, contradicts the goals of the First
Amendment's Free Speech Clause. See id.
153 See id.
154 See id. The Justice also noted that the government's position suggested that consumers should be deceived or deprived of information for their own benefit. See id.
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strength wars. 15 5 In closing, the Justice stated that while regulations geared toward augmenting the public's cognizance of alcohol
content in certain beverages would be proper, § 205(e) (2) was
uninformed and
nothing more than an effort to keep consumers
56
therefore must be found unconstitutional.
Though apparently serving the purpose of extending the commercial speech doctrine to deal with an archaic federal labeling
restriction, 157 the Coors decision manages to leave in its wake a variThe concurring Justice admonished that this belief was not justifiable under any circumstances seeking to deal with restrictions on protected speech. See id.
155 See id. The Justice suggested alternatives to the labeling ban, including a limit
by Congress on the alcohol content of malt beverages. See id. The Justice concluded
that Congress could not accomplish its goal of preventing strength wars by perpetuating the ignorance of consumers at the expense of both sellers' and buyers' free
speech rights. See id.
156 See Coors, 115 S. Ct. at 1597 (Stevens, J., concurring). Specifically, Justice Stevens espoused that § 205(e) (2) was "nothing more than an attempt to blindfold the
public." Id. In Part V of the opinion in 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, Justice
Stevens asserted a similar idea. 116 S.Ct. 1495, 1508 (1996). Justice Stevens stated
that "[t]he First Amendment directs us to be especially skeptical of regulations that
seek to keep people in the dark for what the government perceives to be their own
good." Id.
157 See generally supra notes 6-18 and accompanying text (setting forth the history of
the commercial speech doctrine). The decision in Coors follows the overall trend toward protection established by commercial speech cases beginning with the seminal
case of Virginia State Board of Pharmacy. See, e.g., Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v.
Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 750-52, 773 (1976) (establishing pharmaceutical advertisements as commercial speech and announcing such
speech as a category entitled to protection under the First Amendment); Central
Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 566, 570 (1980)
(holding that a state ban on promotional advertising by utility companies violated
First Amendment commercial speech rights and setting forth a definitive test for future commercial speech case analysis); City of Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc.,
507 U.S. 410, 412, 430-31 (1993) (affirming lower court decisions holding city's interest in curbing commercial speech for safety and esthetic purposes infringed on publisher's free speech rights under the commercial speech doctrine); Edenfield v. Fane,
507 U.S. 761, 777 (1993) (invalidating a state ban on in-person client solicitation by
CPAs as an impermissible restraint on commercial speech); Board of Trustees v. Fox,
492 U.S. 469, 480 (1989) (announcing that a state regulation banning the use of
school property for private commercial activities must have a "reasonable fit" with the
state's interest under the CentralHudson test).
Demonstrating a typically paternalistic nature regarding this category of speech,
the Court tends to stray from its pattern of invalidating state restrictions on the freedom of commercial speech only when an historical vice, namely gambling, or the
dignity of the legal profession is involved. See, e.g., Florida Bar v. Went For It, Inc., 115
S. Ct. 2371, 2376-78 (1995) (upholding state bar association rules requiring attorneys
to recognize a waiting period before contacting accident victims or their relatives in
order to protect victim privacy and avert further negative public response to the legal
profession); United States v. Edge Broadcasting Co., 509 U.S. 418, 421, 436 (1993)
(holding that federal prohibition on interstate broadcasting of lottery advertisements
was allowed on the theory that the underlying activity of gambling, and not merely
advertisements of the activity, fell within Congress's regulatory powers); Posadas de
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ety of unanswered questions and unsettling ideas.1 58 For many
years, both the federal government and the governments of the
several states have made an effort to ensure that the only people
who can legally have access to alcohol are those in a position to
make a responsible decision about its consumption. By raising the
drinking age to twenty-one and providing warnings on the products' labels as to the dangers accompanying drinking alcohol, the
government has provided every means available to facilitate responsible and informed decisions.1 59 In contrast, the government's position in the present case lends itself to an implication
that the very same government would prefer that the American

Puerto Rico Assocs. v. Tourism Co., 478 U.S. 328, 346 (1986) (upholding state ban on
casino advertisements to residents of Puerto Rico on the basis that the legislature
possessed the "greater power" to prohibit gambling altogether); Ohralik v. Ohio State
Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447, 465, 468 (1978) (validating a state prohibition of in-person
attorney solicitation of clients designed to prevent overreaching by professionals
trained in the art of persuasion).
For observers of the Court's path in commercial- speech matters, Coors indicates a
strong show of support for the doctrine, especially considering the fact that it represents the first unanimous decision in a commercial speech case. See Felix H. Kent,
Advertising Law: Roundup of 1995 and a Look Ahead, 214 N.Y. L.J. 115, at 3 (1995).
Additionally, Coors gives rise to the view that the decision implicitly overrules the close
(5-4) decision in Posadas. See id. at 12. As observed by Douglas Kmiec, a constitutional
law scholar at Notre Dame Law School, with every commercial speech case the Court
decides the protection for that category of speech "'just seems to get stronger and
stronger."' See Marcia Coyle, Court Leaves ClifjhangersforLast, NAT'L L.J., May 15, 1995,
at A12. As further noted by Professor Kmiec, the Coors decision "'reinvigorated"' the
Central Hudson test. See id.
158 See Daniel Seligman, The Winding Road to the First Amendment, FORTUNE, July 10,
1995, at 211. Although recognizing that the Coors decision clearly marked a victory
for businesses, commentators have termed it a "wary, wobbly step" in what they have
determined to be the right path for commercial speech. See id. Some observers have
claimed that Coors expanded the methods by which businesses may advertise their
products. See id.; Robert S. Stein, Business and the Supreme Court-This Session Saw Justices Listening to Industry, INVESTOR'S Bus. DAiLY, July 13, 1995, at Al. Others, however,
criticized the Court's actions by arguing that the regulations at issue in Coors were "so
patently dopey" that a review and consideration of controversial legal principles
proved unnecessary and that the decision was nothing more than a "baby step" in the
Court's path to the proper commercial speech analysis and protection. See Seligman,
supra, at 211.
159 See, e.g., 23 U.S.C. § 158 (1988 & Supp. 111990) (setting forth that states complying with the national effort to raise the minimum drinking age to 21 would promptly
receive federal roadway funds each year, while states not in compliance would have
these funds withheld); see also South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 212 (1987) (upholding power of the federal government to condition receipt of roadway funding on
raising minimum drinking age as a valid exercise of Congress's spending power). The
statute's underlying goals proved effective, inasmuch as by July 1, 1988, all 50 states
had raised the minimum age for legal alcohol consumption to 21. See Ray McAllister,
The Drunken Driving Crackdown-Is It Working?, 74 A.B.A. J. 52, 54 (1988).
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consumer be "kept in the dark" as to exactly how much alcohol is
contained in each beer consumed.
The government's position in Coors is somewhat of a contradiction to its typical stance, especially in light of recent disclosure provisions in a variety of areas. 6 ° For example, by requiring the
disclosure of information related to the nutritional components of
nearly every food item and the medicinal elements in a variety of
pharmaceutical products, the government is sending the message
that American consumers should have access to information to assist them in making informed choices, especially regarding products they plan to introduce into their body. 6 ' Additionally, for a
number of years, warnings have been printed on both alcohol and
tobacco products, advising the public of the potential risks associated with the use of such substances.162 Not only is the government requiring manufacturers to disclose the content of certain
items but also to disclose the potential hazards the consumer may
encounter through the use of those same products. The desire to
have consumers make informed, responsible choices has led to this
recent demand for disclosure, and it is this very rationale that
makes the government's position in this case somewhat of an
160 See Arguments Before the Court-IntoxicatingLiquor, 63 U.S.L.W. 3485, 3486 (1995).
During oral argument, Justice Ginsburg asked the government's attorney, Deputy Solicitor General Edwin S. Kneedler, if any other regulations in the food and beverage
subject area prohibited the consumer from knowing what was being put into his or
her body. See id. Mr. Kneedler acknowledged that he knew of none. See id. Justice
Ginsburg also queried whether the BATF would withhold alcohol content information from a consumer who called seeking that particular information. See id. at 3485.
Upon Mr. Kneedler responding that the information was disclosed to consumers who
called the BATF, Justice Ginsburg inquired as to the logic of giving the information
out upon request but not printing that same information on the product label itself.
See id.
161 See Paul M. Barrett, Top Court Showed Sensitivity to Business Last Term, Despite Spotted Owl Ruling, WALL ST. J., June 30, 1995, at B1. Observers of the decisions of the
Court noted that Coors, while obviously aiding brewing companies in product content
disclosure, would also assist other industries that chose to challenge disclosure provisions thought to be excessive. See id.
162 See Nora Fitzgerald, The Supreme Court Considers How Far the First Amendment Will
Stretch, ADWEEK (Eastern ed.), Sept. 18, 1995, at 25. Wally Snyder, president of the
American Advertising Federation, stated that although Congress is in favor of business, that does not always help advertisers. See id. In the context of advertisements,
Snyder noted that often the moral agenda triumphs the business agenda. See id. The
Fifth Circuit, in Dunagin v. City of Oxford, raised an interesting notion when it explained that in the context of advertising, the state's concern was not that the consuming public was uneducated as to the dangers of alcohol but, rather, the concern
was that alcohol ads would promote alcohol consumption, despite the public's knowledge of the related dangers. See 718 F.2d 738, 751 & n.9 (5th Cir. 1983); see also id. at
747-48 (discussing the determination that a direct link exists between advertising and
consumption).
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In striking down the labeling ban, the Supreme Court clearly
achieved the correct result. Had the government had its way in
Coors, the consequence would be the equivalent of saying to American consumers that they may purchase any beer product, fully
aware of the risks inherent in consuming alcohol and cognizant of
the fact that the government considers them old enough to make a
responsible decision about alcohol consumption; however, these
consumers may not receive any assistance from beer manufacturers
to make this informed and responsible decision. As a result of
Coors, the dilemma of how consumers can be expected to make this
informed decision when the government will not allow them to be
made aware of how much alcohol they are consuming, thankfully,
no longer exists.
Debra M. Wallin

163 SeeJohn M. Faust, Of Saloons and Social Control: Assessing the Impact of State Liquor
Control on Individual Expression, 80 VA. L. REv. 745, 785 (1994).

